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TRANSATLANTICISMS: CONSTITUTIONAL 
ASYMMETRY AND SELECTIVE RECEPTION OF U.S. 
LAW AND ECONOMICS IN THE FORMATION OF 
EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW 
Fernanda G. Nicola*
ABSTRACT 
The recurrent claim made by judges, scholars, and lawyers 
shaping the debate on European private law is that there is a 
constitutional asymmetry in the European Union (EU).  The 
asymmetry lies in the fact that European Community competences 
mostly encompass market and economic matters at the expense of 
social issues, while Member States have full jurisdiction over social 
matters but only limited jurisdiction over economic matters.  Thus, 
the European constitutional structure leads to a market/technocratic 
orientation in its supranational institutions, as opposed to the 
social/political orientation of Member State governments.  The 
pervasiveness of this claim allows jurists critiquing European 
adjudication from both the Right and the Left to systematically 
claim that the European Court of Justice lacks democratic 
legitimacy to adjudicate particular cases on European contract or 
torts rules.  Recently, European scholars, lawyers, and judges have 
departed from constitutional asymmetry claims.  This article 
demonstrates that there are several factors that have played an 
important role in undermining the credibility of the constitutional 
asymmetry claim.  First, the emergence of a well-established 
scholarship in European private law has raised awareness among 
academics and lawyers regarding the complexities of the process of 
harmonization of private law.  Second, in light of a transatlantic 
legal dialogue, European jurists have increasingly received law and 
economics from the United States in a context that has been 
hermeneutically rich but increasingly ideologically divided.  While 
the Right and mostly neoliberal scholars welcomed United States 
law and economics, the Left rejected it and promoted a social 
justice agenda for the internal market.  Such selective reception of 
U.S. legal thought contributed to the radicalization of the debate 
over European private law.  Ultimately, with the establishment of a 
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European private law scholarship and the emergence of new 
academic debates, which are increasingly ideologically divided, 
lawyers and scholars are frequently departing from constitutional 
asymmetry claims; instead, they are evaluating the consequences 
the European Court of Justice’s decisions on their own terms. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
This article elucidates some of the changes that have taken place 
over the last decade in the way lawyers, judges, and scholars address the 
question of harmonizing contracts and torts rules in European private 
law.  Methodologically, I depart from a timeworn comparative 
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technique of emphasizing differences and similarities between rules, 
doctrines, and schools of thought in Europe and the United States.1  A 
classic example of such a comparative technique is the claim that 
European lawyers are still formalist because American Legal Realism 
did not take place in Europe or because European jurists did not 
experience the ideological and political shifts that took place in the 
United States over judicial federalism.2  Rather, I concentrate on the 
ideological differences among various groups of lawyers and scholars in 
the debate on European private law and the function that their particular 
claims play regarding the democratic legitimacy of the European 
Judiciary and the neoliberal bias of European integration.  In particular, 
I focus on judicial law making by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
and the role of legal scholarship in shaping the discourse on the 
formation of European private law.3  My claim is that European private 
* Assistant Professor, Washington College of Law, American University.  SJD Candidate,
Harvard Law School and PhD in Comparative Law, University of Trento, Italy.  I am greatly 
indebted to the following individuals for the opportunity to discuss this work in depth: Daniela 
Caruso, Duncan Kennedy, Michele Graziadei, Christian Joerges, and Jerry Frug.  I would like to 
thank Jane Bestor, Jonathan Baker, Isabel Jaramillo, Janet Halley, Ugo Mattei, Anna di Robilant, 
Brishen Rogers, Teemu Ruskola, Ann Shalleck, David Snyder, and the junior faculty workshop at 
the Washington College of Law for their thoughtful comments on this paper.  I am greatly 
indebted to Stephanie Humphries and Ulric Lewen for their invaluable help on this piece.  Errors 
are mine only. 
 1 See Mathias W. Reimann, The Progress and Failure of Comparative Law in the Second 
Half of the Twentieth Century, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 671 (2002) (providing an account of the 
limitations and stagnations in the realm of European private law). 
 2 See Kristoffel Grechenig & Martin Gelter, The Transatlantic Divergence in Legal Thought: 
American Law and Economics vs. German Doctrinalism, 31 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 295 
(2008) (discussing the absence of legal realism in Germany).  Though expressing divergent 
political views on the “new federalism” of the Rehnquist Court, scholars have emphasized that its 
agenda is not committed to an intellectually consistent version of federalism.  Rather, depending 
on the circumstances of the various cases, the Court might or might not favor state rights at the 
expense of the federal government, or vice versa.  See David J. Barron, A Localist Critique Of 
The New Federalism, 51 DUKE L.J. 377 (2001); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The “Conservative” Paths 
of the Rehnquist Court’s Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429 (2002).  As to the judicial 
federalism argument, the U.S. Supreme Court’s dominant mode of legal reasoning and its view 
on federalism have shifted several times over the course of the Twentieth Century.  By 
internalizing the lesson of American Legal Realism, jurists no longer make false associations by 
collapsing institutional competence arguments (federal vs. state; courts vs. legislatures) with 
substantive values (free market vs. social concerns; efficiency vs. equitable distribution).  In fact, 
when a U.S. lawyer addresses the U.S. Supreme Court he does not argue that its judicial law-
making will favor free market values rather than social concerns.  In contrast, until recently 
European lawyers argued that the European Court of Justice favored free market or efficiency 
rationales rather than social and redistributive goals.  See generally DUNCAN KENNEDY, A 
CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (1997); EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL 
REASONING (1948); ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT (3d ed. 2000). 
 3 For similar approaches, see DUNCAN KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF CLASSICAL
LEGAL THOUGHT (2006); Pier Giuseppe Monateri, Critica dell’ideologia e analisi antagonista: il 
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law has changed over time through the establishment of an EU-wide 
private law scholarship.  This scholarship, in turn, has been advanced by 
a number of politically divided groups of scholars who have selectively 
received United States law and economics in a context that has been 
hermeneutically rich but increasingly ideologically divided.4  This 
selective reception of United States law and economics has contributed 
to a radical change in the views of scholars who are involved in the 
debate on European private law.  An example of such a change is the 
use of the “subsidiarity” argument,5 which over time has been adopted 
by diverse groups to achieve opposite political outcomes.6  Initially, 
scholars on the progressive side of the spectrum cited the principle of 
subsidiarity to resist harmonization of private law and to protect 
national private laws.7  Later, scholars on the conservative side of the 
spectrum deployed the subsidiarity principle to advocate for regulatory 
competition and diversity of legal rules rather than the adoption of a 
European civil code.8
Recently, some scholars have claimed that the “lack of success of 
pensiero di Marx e le strategie giuridiche della comparazione,18 RIVISTA CRITICA DEL DIRITTO 
PRIVATO 703 (2000) (It.) [Critique of Ideology and Antagonistic Analysis: Marxism and the 
Legal Strategies of Comparative Law, CRITICAL REVIEW OF PRIVATE RIGHTS].  See also Amr 
Shalakany, Sanhuri and the Historical Origins of Comparative Law in the Arab World, in 
RETHINKING THE MASTERS OF COMPARATIVE LAW 152, 152-189 (Annelise Riles ed., 2001); 
Daniela Caruso, Private Law and Public Stakes in European Integration: The Case of Property, 
10 EUR. L.J. 751, 762 (2004). 
 4 See DIEGO LOPEZ MEDINA, TEORIA IMPURA DEL DERECHO (2004) [IMPURE
THEORY OF LAW]. 
 5 See Treaty Establishing the European Community, art. 5 (ex art. 3b)  (as amended by 
Maastricht in 1992) (using a procedural approach to determining issues of subsidiarity, rather 
than substantive criteria, and stating that “[i]n areas which do not fall within its exclusive 
Competence, the Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, 
only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by 
the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be 
better achieved by the Community”).  See also George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity 
Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 
332, 334 (1994) (analyzing “the apparent contradiction between subsidiarity’s high claims and its 
relatively low esteem”). 
 6 For an analysis of the structure of legal arguments, see Duncan Kennedy, A Semiotics of 
Legal Argument, 42 Syracuse L. Rev. 75 (1991); The Structure of Blackstone’s Commentaries, 28 
Buff. L. Rev. 205 (1979); Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 
1685 (1976).  See also David Kennedy, When Renewal Repeats: Thinking Against the Box, 32 
N.Y.U. J. OF INT’L L. & POL. 335 (2000) (discussing the professional vocabulary international 
lawyers use to debate reform, how one set of ideas gains dominance, and renewal in the field). 
 7 See Hugh Collins, European Private Law and Cultural Identity of States, 3 EUR. REV.
PRIVATE. L. 353 (1995). 
 8 See Roger Van den Bergh, Forced Harmonisation of Contract Law in Europe: Not to Be 
Continued, in AN ACADEMIC GREEN PAPER ON EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW 249 (Stefan 
Grundmann & Jules Stuyck, eds., 2002). 
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the economic analysis of law in Europe to date can be traced to 
characteristics of European culture, legal systems, and the European 
legal academy.”9  In contrast, this article demonstrates that scholars, 
lawyers, and judges have incorporated law and economics in the debate 
on European private law, but in a selective fashion.10  This article shows 
that during the formation of European private law and its body of 
scholarship, a dialogue among lawyers, scholars, and judges, across the 
Atlantic has deeply influenced the current European legal thinking. 
Part II analyzes the creation of European private law when the 
European Commission (EC or “Commission”) first began harmonizing 
contract and tort rules by way of European directives in the mid-1980s, 
which the ECJ then was called on to interpret in the 1990s.  These 
judgments created a sort of federal common law in Europe,11 which 
sparked much criticism among jurists and created what I call a 
“legitimation puzzle.”12  Specifically, European jurists on both sides of 
the political spectrum frequently attacked the ECJ, stating that it lacked 
the institutional competence to adjudicate cases interpreting European 
private law directives.13  In commenting on ECJ adjudication, these 
jurists often conflated institutional competence arguments (European 
level versus Member State level) with substantive value arguments 
(efficiency versus equitable distribution; free market versus social 
goals), assuming that the ECJ was committed to free market and 
efficiency values whereas courts of the Member States were committed 
to social and redistributive goals.  The conflation of institutional 
competence and substantive value arguments was directly connected to 
 9 Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt & Carmen L. Brun, Lost in Translation: The Economic Analysis 
of Law in the United States and in Europe, 44 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 602, 616 (2006).  See also 
Christian Kirchner, The Difficult Reception of Law and Economics in Germany, 11 INT’L REV. L. 
& ECON. 277 (1991).  But see Ugo Mattei & Roberto Pardolesi, Law and Economics in Civil Law 
Countries: A Comparative Approach, 11 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 265-66 (1991). 
 10 This section explains why jurists on the Right have adopted mainstream law and economics 
theories while jurists on the Left have rejected the entire discipline, including its mainstream, 
liberal, and critical approaches.  For an account of the reception of legal theories and ideologies in 
different hermeneutical contexts, see MEDINA, supra note 4. 
 11 See Koen Lenaerts & Kathleen Gutman, Federal Common Law in the European Union: A 
Comparative Perspective From The United States, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 (2006). 
 12 The legitimation puzzle relates to the way in which lawyers attempt to sharply distinguish 
law from ideology because they believe that the former offers a more just and natural worldview 
than the latter.  See KENNEDY, supra note 2, at 236-37. 
 13 See Council Directive 85/374, 1985 O.J. (L210) 29 (EC) [hereinafter Products Liability 
Directive] (on the approximation of the laws, regulations, and administrative provisions of the 
Member States concerning liability for defective products); Council Directive 90/314, 1990 O.J. 
(L158) 59 (EC) [hereinafter Package Travel Directive].  See also Mathias Reimann, Product 
Liability in a Global Context: The Hollow Victory of the European Model, 11 EUR. REV. PRIVATE 
L. 128 (2003) (providing a comparative analysis of the Products Liability Directive). 
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the argument about “constitutional asymmetry” in the EU.  Rather than 
evaluating the consequences of each case on its merits, European jurists 
were constantly adopting constitutional asymmetry arguments to 
delegitimize ECJ law making and question the democracy of the 
European legal architecture as well as its neoliberal economic policies.  
The legitimation puzzle shows how critics despite opposing claims and 
diverging political beliefs agreed that the ECJ was not a democratically 
legitimate forum to decide social reforms or efficiency questions 
specific to the private law regimes of each Member State. 
Part III recasts the process of harmonization of private law within 
the larger politics of economic integration.  It discusses the continuing 
tension between the European level and Member States during two 
alternative phases: negative and positive integration.14  Further, it shows 
how legal scholars, judges, and lawyers have contributed significantly 
to the process of European integration by creating a new European 
professional vocabulary.15  This part shows how some of the most 
influential social scientists making “constitutional asymmetry” claims 
were on the one hand warning about the increasing democratic deficit 
and the neoliberal trend affecting European institutions while at the 
same time “Europeanizing” domestic and national debates.  Instead of 
highlighting the different types of local resistance to integration by 
national bureaucracies or local elites, the constitutional asymmetry 
claim successfully shifted the debate from a domestic level to a 
European level.16
Part IV examines the harmonization of private law from the 
perspective of a European-wide legal scholarship, which is increasingly 
politically divided.  The scholarly debate has been characterized by 
 14 See FRITZ SHARPF, GOVERNING IN EUROPE: EFFECTIVE AND DEMOCRATIC? 43 (1999). 
 15 See PIERRE BOURDIEU, HOMO ACADEMICUS 72-73 (1984); PIERRE BOURDIEU, THE STATE 
NOBILITY: ELITE SCHOOLS IN THE FIELD OF POWER 264 (Lauretta C. Clough trans., Stanford 
Univ. Press 1996) (1989): 
The field of power is a field of forces structurally determined by the state of the 
relations of power among forms of power, or different forms of capital.  It is also, 
and inseparably, a field of power struggles among the holders of different forms of 
power, a gaming space in which those agents and institutions possessing enough 
specific capital (economic or cultural capital in particular) to be able to occupy the 
dominant positions within their respective fields confront each other using strategies 
aimed at preserving or transforming these relations of power. 
 16 For local resistance to European integration, see Daniela Caruso, The Missing View of the 
Cathedral: The Private Law Paradigm of European Legal Integration, 3 EUR. L.J. 3 (1997); 
Henry G. Schermers, Comment on Weiler’s The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L. J. 2525, 
2527 (1991).  On the shift from the national to the international and how a depolitization effect is 
intrinsic in such a move, see David Kennedy, Receiving the International, 10 CONN J. INT’L L. 1 
(1994). 
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three different phases where, over time, opposing elites, consisting of 
lawyers and scholars, have departed from constitutional asymmetry 
claims.  This approach to the European scholarly debate shows how 
jurists have deployed similar policy arguments and, often, constitutional 
asymmetry claims in support of opposing normative aspirations.17  
Scholars on the Right and the Left have radically shifted their positions 
in favor or against harmonization of private law during this time.  
However, today there are two main opposing groups: neoliberal lawyers 
advocating for an efficient common market and greater regulatory 
competition and welfarist lawyers advocating for greater social justice 
and a European civil code for private law. 
Part V offers a further explanation of why European scholars, 
lawyers, and judges have departed from making constitutional 
asymmetry claims.  In the last decade, European jurists increasingly 
have participated in a transatlantic debate by selectively receiving 
United States law and economics in a hermeneutically rich context.18  
However, while neoliberal scholars have welcomed mainstream United 
States law and economics, social justice advocates have in large part 
rejected it, even the more progressive version that addresses distributive 
concerns.  This selective reception of U.S. law and economics by 
European lawyers has had two results.  First, it has contributed to the 
radicalization of the debate on the harmonization of private law.  
Second, it has obliged lawyers, scholars, and judges to depart from 
making constitutional asymmetry claims to instead evaluate the 
efficiency and distributive consequences of each European private law 
rule. 
II. COURTS AND LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP IN EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW 
A. From European Integration to the Harmonization of Private Law 
The creation of a European private law is conceptually problematic 
for jurists who traditionally understand private law as those provisions 
enshrined in continental civil codes that regulate contract, tort, and 
property law and later on included consumer, landlord and tenant, and 
labor law provisions.19  Therefore, European lawyers tend to consider 
this more or less coherent body of private law rules as inherently 
 17 For an analysis of the structure of legal arguments, see sources cited supra note 6. 
 18 See MEDINA, supra note 4, at Prologo XIV. 
 19 See FRANZ WIEACKER, A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LAW IN EUROPE, WITH PARTICULAR 
REFERENCE TO GERMANY (Tony Weir trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1995). 
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controlled by national governments and interpreted by domestic 
courts.20  However, due to the prominent role of the European 
Community in adopting and interpreting directives aimed at modifying 
private law rules, this belief has radically changed in the last twenty 
years.  Today jurists are obliged to re-conceptualize conventional legal 
categories in order to address the changing notion of European private 
law. 
In 1992, the Treaty of Maastricht adopted EC Treaty art. 95 that 
gave the Community the power to harmonize national legislation only if 
it contributes to the establishment and functioning of the internal 
market.  Similar to the Commerce Clause in the United States, this 
provision gives the Community relatively broad powers to issue 
directives and to harmonize specific private law rules.21  In the late 
1950s, however, it was not clear which instruments the Community 
could use to create the internal market and implement the four freedoms 
(free movement of goods, services, capital, and persons).22  By the 
1960s, the ECJ began “constitutionalizing” the Treaty.  Through the 
adoption of the doctrines of supremacy of EC law and direct effect, the 
Court exercised strict scrutiny over the implementation of EC law by 
the Member States.23  For many commentators, the Court became the 
 20 On the understanding of “private law” as a coherent body, see Duncan Kennedy, Thoughts 
on Coherence, Social Values and National Tradition in Private Law, in THE POLITICS OF A 
EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE (Martjin Hesselink ed., 2006). 
 21 The term “harmonization,” or approximation, of the laws was introduced in the original 
Treaty of Rome (1958) under article 100 (now EC Treaty art. 94) with the goal of eliminating the 
distortions of competition created by the laws of the Member States.  The Single European Act 
(1987) adopted article 100A (now EC Treaty art. 95) that required majority voting rather than 
unanimity to achieve the approximation of national measures for the establishment and 
functioning of the common market.  In contrast, under EC Treaty art. 95, the Council decides via 
majority voting through a co-decision procedure.  See Treaty Establishing the European 
Community, Dec. 24, 2002, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 251 [hereinafter EC Treaty] (stating that the 
European Council and the European Parliament share equal powers), available at 
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/en/treaties/dat/12002E/pdf/12002E_EN.pdf; see also Walter van 
Gerven, Harmonization of Private Law: Do We Need It?, 41 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 505, (2004). 
 22 See CATHERINE BARNARD, THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF THE EU: THE FOUR FREEDOMS 10 
(2004): 
The creation of a common market lies at the heart of the EU.  Article 2 says that the 
Community has as its task the establishment of a common market, and one of the 
activities of the Community listed in Article 3 is the creation of ‘an internal market 
characterized by the abolition, as between Member States, of obstacles to the free 
movement of goods, persons, services and capital.’ 
 23 With the doctrine of Direct Effect the ECJ has confirmed that the Treaty, as well as 
Regulations and in certain cases European directives, directly confer individual rights to persons 
who can enforce those rights before their domestic court.  See Case 26/62, Van Gend v. 
Netherlands, 1963 E.C.R. 00095; Case 6/64, Costa v. Ente Nazionale per l’Energia Electrica, 
1964 E.C.R. 585. 
NICOLA_ARTICLE_FINAL 5/7/2008  2:23:55 PM 
200X] TRANSATLANTICISM IN EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW 109 
 
engine of market integration, acting as a quasi-federal judiciary.24  
Through vertical judicial review, the ECJ struck down national laws that 
conflicted with EC law because they created an impediment to the free 
movement of goods between Member States.25  By the 1990s, it became 
clear that EC law, encompassing free movement and competition law, 
as interpreted by the ECJ was the instrument par excellence of market 
integration.26
Unlike the United States, the EU did not create a system of federal 
courts.  Thus, what is largely understood as European private law results 
from the complex interplay between harmonizing directives and 
national private law regimes.  The process of private law harmonization 
encompasses a large number of legal formants, or legal sources, and 
institutional actors both at the European and at the national level.27  
European private law comprises a variety of legal rules, which derive 
from legislative, judicial, and scholarly sources operating at different 
levels of government.28  The legislative formant of European private 
law comprises both the body of EC legislation, namely directives that 
since the mid-1980s created a patchwork harmonization of private law 
rules, and national legal rules enshrined in continental civil codes and 
Member States’ own legal traditions interpreting those laws.29  
Therefore, European private law also encompasses those legal 
 24 See J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L. J. 2403 (1991).  The 
question of whether Europe is a federation or something else has been the object of studies on 
integration through law since the late 1970s.  See 1:1 INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW: EUROPE 
AND THE AMERICAN FEDERAL EXPERIENCE (Mauro Cappelletti et. al. eds., 1986).  However, 
during the 1990s, the dominant political science vocabulary addressed the EU as a polity less 
integrated than a federation but more integrated than a custom union, namely a “multi-level 
system of governance”—a polity composed of multiple layers of government in which power is 
diffused across the different levels rather than hierarchically imposed.  See LIESBET HOOGHE & 
GARY MARKS, MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION (2001); 
GOVERNANCE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (Gary Marks et. al. eds., 1996); Gary Marks, Liesbet 
Hooghe & Kermit Blank, European Integration from the 1980s: State-Centric v. Multilevel 
Governance, 34 J. COMMON MKT. STUDS. 341 (1996).  However, to simplify some aspects of the 
comparison with the United States, this article uses the term “federal.” 
 25 See Case 8/74, Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville, 1974 E.C.R. 00873, para. 5 (citing the 
broad formula deployed by the ECJ: “All trading rules enacted by Member States which are 
capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade are to 
be considered as measures having an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions.”). 
 26 See generally MIGUEL POIARES MADURO, WE, THE COURT (2000); REIN WESSELING, THE 
MODERNIZATION OF EC ANTITRUST LAW (2000). 
 27 See Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law, 39 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 1 (1991); RODOLFO SACCO, INTRODUZIONE AL DIRITTO COMPARATO (5th ed.1992). 
 28 See P.G. Monateri & Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE 
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 531 (Peter Newman ed., 1998). 
 29 See Reiner Schultze, European Private Law and Existing EC Law, 13 Eur. Rev. Private. L. 
3, 4 (2005). 
NICOLA_ARTICLE_FINAL 5/7/2008  2:23:55 PM 
110 CARDOZO J. OF INT’L & COMP. LAW [Vol. NN:000 
 
provisions that Member States have introduced into their pre-existent 
civil codes in order to transpose European directives. 
In response to the democratic concerns raised by policy-makers 
and academics, the Commission in 2001 consulted with stakeholders 
likely to be affected by European contract law to determine whether to 
continue adopting consumer protection directives and soft law 
instruments or whether to adopt a more comprehensive European 
contract code.30  In February 2003, the European Commission published 
an Action Plan aimed at achieving greater coherence in European 
contract law.31  The Action Plan reflects the concerns raised by 
stakeholders and academics, and it attempts to resolve the practical and 
technical problems arising from the divergence of national contract law 
regimes.32  By targeting the obstacles that prevent the ‘smooth 
functioning’ of the internal market, the Action Plan aspired to improve 
the quality of Community regulation through legislative transparency 
and stakeholders’ participation. 
In the Action Plan, the Commission addresses contract law but 
appears uncertain about which tools to employ; for example, whether to 
use hard or soft measures or sectoral or comprehensive initiatives to 
achieve its goal of an efficient and coherent regulation of contract law.  
In departing from a European codification, the Action Plan ameliorates 
the existent contract acquis.33  It does so by improving coherence 
through both a hard measure and a soft one, in particular the non-
binding Common Frame of Reference (CFR).34  Similar to the 
Restatement of Contracts in the U.S., the CFR aims to increase 
coherence of European contract law and to achieve the uniform 
application of directives.  But the Commission carefully avoids the term 
 30 See Commission of the Eur. Communities, Communication from Commission to the 
Council & the European Parliament on European Contract Law, COM (2001) 398 final (Nov. 7 
2001) [hereinafter Com. on Contract Law]. 
 31 See Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to 
the European Parliament and Council – A More Coherent European Contract Law – An Action 
Plan, COM (2003) 68 final (Dec. 2 2003) [hereinafter Action Plan]. 
 32 See Com. on Contract Law, supra note 30; see also Dirk Staudemayer, The Commission 
Action Plan on European Contract Law, 2 EUR. REV. PRIVATE. L. 113 (2003). 
 33 The acquis communataire in a particular legal field encompasses all EC law sources 
stemming from the treaty, community acts (regulations, directives, or communications), and case 
law from the ECJ and the Court of First Instance (CFI).  See, infra note 116; Action Plan, supra 
note 31. 
 34 See Action Plan, supra note 31 para. 77 (addressing consolidation, codification, and the 
existing instruments as possible means to achieve greater coherence).  “Codification means the 
adoption of a new legal instrument which brings together in a single text, but without changing 
the substance, a previous instrument and it successive amendments, with the new instrument 
replacing the old one and repealing it.”  Id. at n.56. 
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“code” and instead adopts the softer notion of CFR.  This non-binding 
codification aims to provide common principles, terminology, and rules 
for contract law in order to address gaps, conflicts, and ambiguities in 
the application of European contract law.35
According to the Commission, the obstacles arising from the non-
uniform implementation of directives by Member States leads to 
inconsistencies and fragmentation of contract regimes, creating different 
legal rules for the same commercial situation.36  The Commission 
maintains that a non-uniform application of contract rules entails high 
transaction costs, which burden both industries and ‘active’ consumers 
in search of precious information.37  High transaction costs emerge not 
only in the formation of cross-border contracts, but also through judicial 
control over the fairness of contractual terms.38  In order to achieve 
greater coherence in the application of European contract law, and 
consequently reduce transaction costs, the Commission’s strictly 
functionalist approach aims to improve the quality of the existing 
European legislation and case law.  In short, the Action Plan reinforces 
the view that the existence of different contract law regimes creates a 
barrier to trade and cross-border transactions within the internal EU 
market.  Thus, coherence means more efficient outcomes, which can be 
reached through more uniform implementation and maximal 
harmonization.39
In response to the Action Plan, the European Parliament (EP) also 
recognized the need for further harmonization in order to facilitate 
cross-border transactions within the internal market.40  Even though the 
 35 See id. at paras. 55-68. 
[T]he Commission will seek to increase, where necessary and possible, coherence 
between instruments, which are part of the EC contract law acquis, both in their 
drafting and in their implementation and application.  Proposals will, where 
appropriate, take into account a common frame of reference, which the Commission 
intends to elaborate via research and with the help of all interested parties.  This 
common frame of reference should provide for best solutions in terms of common 
terminology and rules . . . . 
Id. at Executive Summary. 
 36 See id. paras.16-24, 57.  See also Rodolfo Sacco, L’Interpret et la Regle de Droit 
Europeenne, in LES MULTIPLES LANGUES DU DROIT EUROPÉEN UNIFORME 226, 226−38 
(Rodolfo Sacco & Luca Castellani eds., 1999). 
 37 See Action Plan, supra note 31, paras. 25−51. 
 38 See id. paras. 34-36.  For example, more information is necessary for different national 
mandatory rules limiting or excluding contractual liability. 
 39 See id. para. 57 (“An improved acquis should enhance the uniform application of 
Community law as well as facilitate the smooth functioning of cross-border transactions, and, 
thereby, the completion of the internal market.”). 
 40 See id.  The EP argues that new harmonizing directives on contract law should be based on 
EC Treaty art. 95, and, in the aftermath of the Tobacco Advertising judgment (infra note 83), their 
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EP offered its political guidance in order to encourage further 
Europeanization of contract law, it warned the Commission not to 
overstep the boundaries of Community competences.41  Supranational 
institutions, such as the Commission, the Council, and the European 
Parliament, are particularly concerned that EC Treaty art. 5 and the 
principle of attributed competences of the Community are respected.   
B. Conflciting Views on the “Federal Common Law”: Constitutional 
Assymetry in the Eurpoean Union 
Once the European Commission adopts the same directives that the 
ECJ has in the last ten years, it will exercise the role of the uniform 
interpreter of Community law, thus creating a federal common law for 
Europe.  This Part addresses products liability litigation through 
numerous decisions by the ECJ on the non-conformity of national laws 
with the Products Liability Directive, focusing on the different reactions 
by two groups of scholars to the ECJ judgments interpreting the Product 
Liability Directive and the Travel Package Directive.  The section 
emphasizes that, despite their conflicting political views and normative 
aspirations on private law, both groups of lawyers deploy similar 
arguments to criticize ECJ adjudication.  They both claim, for different 
reasons, that rather than having the ECJ decide crucial distributive 
questions through private law adjudication, such decisions should be 
made by democratically elected national legislatures. 
In Gonzaléz Sánchez, a Spanish citizen brought a claim under 
Spanish law seeking compensation for injuries suffered as the result of a 
blood transfusion during which she was infected with Hepatitis C.  The 
defendant, Medicina Asturiana, who owned the medical premises where 
the transfusion took place, challenged the applicability of the national 
provisions in light of a subsequent national law that transposed the 
Product Liability Directive.42  The national court concluded that the 
rights conferred to consumers were more extensive under the Spanish 
law invoked by the plaintiff than under the law transposing the 
directive.43  Through a preliminary question, the Spanish tribunal 
referred the matter to the ECJ to determine whether, under Article 13 of 
primary goal should be to establish and promote the internal market. 
 41 See Staudemayer, supra note 32, at 116-17. 
 42 See Products Liability Directive, supra note 13. 
 43 See Case C-183/00, González Sanchéz v. Medicina Asturiana SA, C-183/00 judgment, 
2002 E.C.R. I-03901 [hereinafter González]; C-183-00, González v. Medicina Asturiana SA, 
Opinion of the A.G. Geelhoed, 2002 E.C.R. I-03827, at paras.16−19 [hereinafter A.G. Opinion] 
(explaining the difference between the regime under Spanish law and the regime set up by the 
Products Liability Directive). 
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the Product Liability Directive, the rights conferred under national 
legislation to plaintiffs in defective product cases were to be restricted 
or limited as a result of the transposition of the Directive into domestic 
law.44
The Spanish government and the Commission supported the 
defendant’s argument, asserting that the purpose of the Product Liability 
Directive was to harmonize the laws of the Member States.  They 
argued that Article 13 of the directive did not allow Member States to 
maintain a liability regime that was more favorable to plaintiffs than the 
one provided by the Directive.45
Agreeing with the plaintiff, the Greek, French, and Austrian 
governments advocated the opposite interpretation of the Product 
Liability Directive provision.  They argued that because the Directive 
was an incomplete measure, it allowed Member States to exercise their 
discretion in adopting a liability standard more favorable to the plaintiff.  
Relying on the EC consumer protection title enshrined in EC Treaty art. 
153, the governments claimed that the Directive entailed only minimal 
harmonization, which did not preempt Member States’ laws.  They 
asserted that the Community was committed to guaranteeing a 
minimum threshold of protection, while allowing Member States to 
maintain or adopt more stringent protective measures.46
The ECJ held that “Article 13 of the Directive cannot be 
interpreted as giving the Member States the possibility of maintaining a 
general system of product liability different from that provided for in 
the Directive.”47  The opinion of Advocate General (A.G.) Geelhoed 
recalled the history of the Directive and the fact that the negotiation 
process was difficult due to the high political stakes involved for both 
businesses and consumers.  In contrast to EC Treaty art. 95, which 
comprises the legal basis of the Directive and was unanimously adopted 
 44 See González, para. 13. 
 45 Id. paras. 19, 33−34.  Such interpretation would create barriers to trade for the functioning 
of the internal market. 
 46 Id. paras. 21-28.  The Court relied on three arguments addressing the purpose, the wording, 
and the structure of the directive.  First, the ECJ clarified that the purpose of the directive was to 
“ensure undistorted competition between traders, to facilitate free movement of goods and to 
avoid differences in levels of consumer protection.”  Id. para. 26.  Second, in addressing the text 
of the directive the Court highlighted that “the Directive contains no provision expressly 
authorizing the Member States to adopt or maintain more stringent provisions in matters in 
respect of which it makes provision, in order to secure a higher level of consumer protection.”  Id. 
para. 27.  Third, in clarifying the structure of the Directive, the Court held that “the fact that the 
Directive provides for certain derogations or refers in certain cases to national law does not mean 
that in regard to the matters which it regulates harmonization is not complete.”  Id. para. 28. 
 47 Id. para. 30. 
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by the Council, EC Treaty, art. 94 did not explicitly allow Member 
States to maintain or establish more stringent provisions.  Because of 
the difficulty in reaching an agreement among parties with conflicting 
interests, the Directive was intended to completely harmonize product 
liability and to establish a specific liability regime reflecting a complex 
political equilibrium.48
Moreover, the ECJ held that the consumer protection title 
contained in EC Treaty art. 153, allowing Member States to maintain 
higher standards of consumer protection, was not to “be relied on . . . [to 
seek] a minimum harmonization of the laws of the Member States.”49  
The ECJ followed the reasoning of A.G. Geelhoed, who claimed that if 
the Community wanted to change the liability regime, it could adopt a 
new directive using a different legal basis, thereby modifying the 
particular balance struck between consumers and producers when the 
Directive was adopted in 1985.50  Through deductive legal reasoning, 
the A.G. further justified a maximal harmonization regime for the 
Product Liability Directive on textual grounds.  He referred to the 
preamble of the directive, which explicitly referred to the unity and the 
functioning of the internal market.  Therefore, he claimed that a 
minimal harmonization regime not adequately would fulfill this goal.51
 48 Id. para. 23; see also A.G. Opinion, supra note 43, para. 39.  The Advocate General is not a 
public prosecutor.  He is a member of the ECJ, even though he does not participate in its 
deliberations, and he has the same status as a judge.  His individual opinion is presented after the 
oral proceedings, but it does not reflect the view of the Court.  However, when the ECJ follows 
the A.G. opinion, it constitutes a precious source of information on the legal reasoning adopted by 
the ECJ. 
 49 See González, supra note 43, para. 24; see also A.G. Opinion, supra note 43, para. 43. 
[I]nserted into the Treaty after the adoption of the Directives . . . Article 153 EC is 
worded as a valid instruction to the Community with regard to future policies.  
Under that provision, the Community legislature would be entitled to undertake 
initiatives to shift, in favor of consumers, the current balance between the interests of 
producers and not those of consumers which is laid down in the Directive.  However, 
Article 153 EC does not, under any circumstances, grant Member States the power 
unilaterally to adopt measures, which would infringe the rules of Community laid 
down in directives to date.  Any other interpretation would endanger the acquis 
communautaire of the uniformity and correct functioning of the common market. 
Id. para. 43. 
 50 See González, supra note 43, para. 24.  This interpretation by the ECJ has important 
implications for future harmonization measures since it establishes a presumption in favor of  
maximal harmonisation.  Unless future directives contain a provision explicitly authorizing 
Member States to maintain or adopt legislation that is more stringent to secure a high level of 
consumer protection, the presumption will be against such a possibility. 
 51 See A.G. Opinion, supra note 43. 
The objective of the unity and functioning of the common market, which is set out in 
the first and last recitals, does not accord with the view that the Directive only 
provides for minimum harmonization.  It can be deduced from the wording of the 
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The same opinion by A.G. Geelhoed in Gonzaléz supported an 
analogous judgment in Commission v. France.52  The Commission 
challenged the French government, alleging non-conformity in 
transposing the Product Liability Directive.  The French government 
argued that such transposition would have infringed Article 6(1) of the 
European Convention on Human Rights by denying a fair trial to the 
plaintiffs, who, under the Product Liability Directive, were left in a 
situation of damnum absque injuria.  The ECJ decided that European 
law preempted those French product liability provisions, which were 
incompatible with the Directive and more favorable to consumers.  
Thus, the Court condemned France for not implementing the same 
liability standards imposed by the Product Liability Directive.53
In his opinion, A.G. Geelhoed explained that the evolution of 
western private law at the beginning of the twentieth century developed 
social legislation in order to protect vulnerable categories, such as 
employees, tenants, and consumers.  This ad hoc legislation deployed to 
protect particular disadvantaged groups was created in derogation of 
general private law regimes, which continued to apply as the default 
rule.  The decision about which category of harms and in which 
situation the law should protect certain groups should be reached as the 
result of a balancing conflicting considerations, and only the legislature 
can balance “l’interet juridique materiel et l’efficacité de 
l’administration de la justice.”  The A.G. explained that the product 
liability directive was the clear result of this balancing, and no 
individual Member State could derogate from it.  Thus, changes would 
require a future policy enacted by the Community legislature.54
In the aftermath of this judgment, France did not change one of the 
last two recitals that the Community legislature considered that harmonization was 
incomplete because there were still derogations open to the Member States. 
Id. para. 50. 
 52 Case C-52/00, Commission  v. French Republic, 2002 E.C.R. I-03827. 
 53 Id.  The Court held that: 
- by including damage less of EUR 500 in Article 1386-2 of the Civil Code; 
- by providing in the first paragraph of Article 1386-7 thereof that the supplier of a 
defective product is to be liable in all cases and on the same basis as the producer, 
and 
- by providing in the second paragraph of Article 1386-12 thereof that the producer 
must prove that he has taken appropriate steps to avert the consequences of a 
defective product in order to be able to rely on the grounds of exemption from 
liability provided for in Article 7(d) and (e) of the Directive, 
the French Republic has failed to fulfil [sic] its obligations under Articles 9(b), 3(3) 
and 7 of the aforementioned directive 
Id. para. 49. 
 54 See A.G. Opinion, supra note 43, para. 68. 
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provisions of its civil code that conflicts with the Products Liability 
Directive, which expressly exempts from liability the supplier of a 
product when the producer of the product can be identified.  In contrast, 
the French civil code considered the supplier of a defective product 
liable on the same basis as the producer, even if the supplier informed 
the injured person of the supplier’s identity within a reasonable time.  In 
its judgment in March 2006, the ECJ held that France was in breach of 
Community law not only by incorrectly transposing the directive but 
also by not complying with the previous judgment of the ECJ.55  Thus, 
the French Republic was required to pay a penalty to the community, 
whereby the ECJ ordered: 
the French Republic to pay to the Commission of the European 
Communities, into the ‘European Community own resources’ 
account, a penalty payment of EUR 31 650 for each day of delay in 
taking the necessary measures to comply fully with the judgment in 
Case C-52/00 Commission v France from delivery of the present 
judgment until full compliance with the judgment in that case.56
Similar to the French saga, in Commission v. Greece, the ECJ 
found that the Greek consumer protection law did not include a 
provision limiting recoverable damages to the five hundred Euro 
threshold mentioned in Article 9 of the Product Liability Directive.57  
Greece attempted to justify its domestic provision by arguing that the 
directive merely achieved a minimum harmonization regime that 
allowed the Member States to maintain domestic provisions more 
favorable to consumers.  Moreover, it argued that the concept of 
damage was not within the scope of the directive; thus, it should be 
interpreted under national law to require full compensation to the 
injured party.58
In following its previous judgments and the Opinion of the A.G., 
the ECJ held that the Directive “seeks to achieve in the matters 
regulated by it, complete harmonization of the laws, regulations and 
administrative provision of the Member States.”59  As to the 
incompatibility of the threshold with the principles of Greek private 
law, the ECJ used deductive reasoning and held that, “. . . the recourse 
 55 Case C-177/04, Commission v. French Republic, O.J. 2006 C131/10 (where the ECJ held 
that “the French Republic has failed to take the necessary measures to comply fully with the 
judgment in Case C-52/00 Commission v. France as regards the transposition of Article 3(3) of 
Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 . . . .”).  Id. para. 1. 
 56 Id. at para. 2. 
 57 See Case C- 154/00, Commission v. Hellenic Republic, 2002 E.C.R. I – 03870, para. 8. 
 58 See id. paras. 22−23. 
 59 Id. para. 20. 
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to provisions of domestic law to restrict the scope of the provisions of 
Community law would have the effect of undermining the unity and 
efficacy of that law and cannot consequently be accepted.”60
Commentators have debated this well-known trilogy of cases.  
Commentators on the Left were especially enraged by the ECJ decisions 
for at least three different reasons, which have varied over time.  First, 
Daniela Caruso addressed legislative resistance against European 
integration emerging from the failed transposition of the Product 
Liability Directive in France.61  According to the resistance thesis, 
while European bureaucrats and judges were deploying increasing 
formalism in defending the doctrinal coherence of European law, 
national elites were resisting its effects in France.62
In the context of transposing the directive, the French government 
was in a difficult situation: it had to adopt unpopular legislation over the 
protests of national legal elites because it had to comply with its 
obligations towards the Community under EC Treaty art. 10.63  Not 
surprisingly, France took more than a decade to implement the Product 
Liability Directive, and it was condemned twice by the ECJ.  Despite 
the fact that, at the declaratory level, the French civil code embraced a 
negligence regime, in practice, due to judge made law, courts relied on 
the code provisions in sales contracts to enact a strict liability regime for 
victims of product-related accidents.  Because France’s liability 
standards were considered more favorable to consumers than the ones 
set by the directive, the Commission in 1998 brought the French 
government before the ECJ for a second time to implement the 
directive.  Both national politicians and the legal profession in France 
had persistently resisted the complete transposition of the Product 
Liability Directive. 
Second, European consumer advocates claimed that the ECJ 
rulings tipped the balance in favor of a particular approach to European 
consumer policy: serving consumer interests through the internal market 
 60 Id. para. 24. 
 61 See Caruso, supra note 16, at 15 (claiming that the implementation of the Products 
Liability Directive had important distributive consequences that the French Parliament was not 
comfortable with). 
 62 See id. 
 63 EC Treaty art. 10 imposes upon Member States an obligation “[to] abstain from any 
measure which could jeopardize the attainment of the objectives of this Treaty.”  EC Treaty art. 
10, supra note 21.  The ECJ has interpreted EC Treaty art. 10 to apply to unimplemented 
directives and has imposed a duty on Member States to “refrain from taking any measures liable 
seriously to compromise the result prescribed.”  Case C-129/96, Inter-Environmental Wallonie 
ASBL v. Region Wallonie, 1997 E.C.R. I-07411, para. 45; see also Case C-14/02, ATRAL SA v. 
Belgian State, 2003 E.C.R. I-04431. 
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and increasing consumer choice.64  In contrast, they maintained that, 
despite the ECJ trend toward self-regulation and the increasing maximal 
harmonization tendency, EC consumer policy should remain a critical 
tool to be widely developed for the protection of weaker parties rather 
than enhancing consumer choice.65  In particular, they stated that before 
Commission v. France the Court had never taken such a clear-cut 
position toward maximal harmonization.  In fact, previous ECJ 
judgments interpreting harmonizing directives in this area suggested a 
less strict rule and a more flexible standard vis à vis the preemption of 
Member State laws.66
Third, social justice advocates argued that the ECJ should refrain 
from deciding questions that should be determined by democratic 
institutions.67  Although not explicitly, these lawyers deployed 
institutional competence arguments to express their skepticism on two 
different fronts.  First, they were skeptical that legal elites sitting in 
Luxembourg would preserve the social justice values embedded in 
national traditions and instead thought these elites would come to 
prioritize market goals.  Second, in following a Jacobinian tradition, 
they believed that legal elites, in particular lawyers and judges, could 
not be trusted to achieve social justice because, contrary to legislatures, 
courts have not traditionally been a forum for social struggles.68
 64 See Jules Stuyck, European Consumer Law After the Treaty of Amsterdam: Consumer 
Policy in or Beyond the Internal Market?, 37 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 367, 400 (2000) (“The 
acceptance of the proper functioning of the (internal) market and the effective competition policy 
as the very foundations of consumer policy does not mean that the consumer is reduced to the 
status of a benefit-maximizing creature.  Consumer wants, no matter how frivolous . . . can be 
expressed in the market.”). 
 65 See Geraint Howells & Thomas Wilhelmsson, EC Consumer Law: Has it Come of Age? 28 
EUR. L. REV. 370, 376 (2003). 
Thus, the scope for using the Treaty to allow Member States to improve on 
European solutions is therefore very narrow.  If maximal harmonization is the 
favored approach of the Commission there will be no minimal harmonization clauses 
in the directive(s) and the Court is unlikely to be able to construe the directive as a 
minimal one. . . .  Maximal harmonization fits into a pattern of approaches to 
Community regulation that favor trade liberalization. 
Id. at 376. 
 66 See Fabio Marchetti & Fernanda Nicola, Constitutionalizing Tobacco: The Ambivalence of 
European Federalism, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 507, 513 (2005). 
 67 See Hugh Collins, Editorial: The Future of European Private Law: An Introduction, 10 
EUR. L.J. 649, 650 (2004). 
 68 See CARLO AUGUSTO CANNATA & ANTONIO GAMBARO, LINEAMENTI DI STORIA DELLA 
GIURISPRUDENZA EUROPEA (3d ed. 1989). 
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C. The Activist European Court of Justice and the Legitimation Puzzle 
In Simone Leitner v. TUI Deutschland GmbH, the Court was asked 
to interpret the notion of damages for the non-performance of a 
contractual obligation.69  Simone Leitner, a ten-year-old girl whose 
parents booked an all-inclusive two-week holiday at a club in Turkey 
through the travel agent TUI, developed symptoms of salmonella 
poisoning attributed to the club’s food.  The girl’s illness lasted 
throughout the holiday and two weeks following her return to Austria.  
Simone Leitner brought an action for damages against TUI before an 
Austrian trial court, which awarded her damages for only physical pain 
and suffering but denied her non-material damages for loss of 
enjoyment of the holiday. 
On appeal, the Austrian Landesgericht Linz referred the question 
of the interpretation of Article 5 of the Package Travel Directive to the 
ECJ.  The question concerned which damages the organizer and/or the 
retailer were liable for as a result of the non-performance or the 
improper performance of the package tour contract.70  Specifically, the 
Austrian court asked the ECJ whether the directive required Member 
States to provide for compensation of non-material damages, which 
were excluded under Austrian law. 
 69 See Case C-168/00, Simone Leitner v. TUI Deutschland GmbH & Co. KG, 2002 E.C.R. I-
02631. 
 70 Package Travel Directive, supra note 13.  Article 5 provides: 
1. Member States shall take the necessary steps to ensure that the organizer and/or 
retailer party to the contract is liable to the consumer for the proper performance of 
the obligations arising from the contract, irrespective of whether such obligations are 
to be performed by that organizer and/or retailer or by other suppliers of services 
without prejudice to the right of the organizer and/or retailer to pursue those other 
suppliers of services. 
2. With regard to the damage resulting for the consumer from the failure to perform 
or the improper performance of the contract, Member States shall take the necessary 
steps to ensure that the organizer and/or retailer is/are liable unless such failure to 
perform or improper performance is attributable neither to any fault of theirs nor to 
that of another supplier of services . . . . 
In the matter of damages arising from the non-performance or improper performance 
of the services involved in the package, the Member States may allow compensation 
to be limited in accordance with the international conventions governing such 
services. 
In the matter of damage other than personal injury resulting from the non-
performance or improper performance of the services involved in the package, the 
Member States may allow compensation to be limited under the contract.  Such 
limitation shall not be unreasonable. 
3. Without prejudice to the fourth subparagraph of § 2, there may be no exclusion by 
means of a contractual clause from the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2. 
Id. at art. 5. 
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On the defendant’s side, the Austrian, the French, and the Finnish 
government asserted that the Travel Package Directive aimed to provide 
minimal harmonization; that is, what was not expressly covered by the 
text of the Travel Package Directive remained a matter of Member 
States’ competences.  On the plaintiff’s side, the Belgian government 
and the Commission pointed out that since the purpose of the Travel 
Package Directive was to approximate the laws of Member States, 
“damages” as used in the text was to be ‘construed broadly’ to include 
the notion of non-material damages caused by loss of enjoyment of a 
holiday.  The ECJ holding recognized the right to compensation for 
damage other than personal injury, including non-material damages.71
Prominent commentators criticized the holding of the ECJ.  In 
particular, jurists advocating for regulatory competition and greater 
efficiency of the common market have emphasized the activism of the 
Leitner court and the consequences precipitated by the case.  They 
argue that the judgment created a ‘floodgate’ concern within the 
Austrian legal system because it created the potential for judges to 
award high non-material damages with respect to package-holidays.  
They argued that Leitner would serve as precedent and create incentives 
for consumers to litigate claims for high damages, thereby turning 
litigation into an insurance mechanism.  Scholars have pointed out that, 
in extending the compensation for non-material damages, this decision 
“stands [as] a fundamental value judgment with far-reaching economic 
implications which the Community apparently was not (yet) ready to 
take when the Directive was discussed by its institutions.  This issue 
was still left to the Member States.”72
These jurists have a neoliberal Hayekian understanding of how the 
market should function in the European Union and the role that courts 
and legislatures should play in the single market.  In particular, these 
neoliberal jurists have asserted that the problem with the EU legal 
system is that courts, instead of national parliaments, are making 
important social welfare choices.  These jurists highlight that the Leitner 
holding is likely to alter an important equilibrium within national 
private law regimes by undertaking the “Promethean job of creating a 
European private law [which] should be shouldered by other 
 71 See Leitner, supra note 69.  The Court affirmed that Article 5 [of the Package Travel 
Directive] “is to be interpreted as conferring, in principle, on consumers a right to compensation 
for non-material damage resulting from the non-performance or improper performance of the 
services constituting a package holiday.”  Id. para. 24. 
 72 Wulf-Henning Roth, Case C-168/00 Simone Leitner v. TUI Deutschland GmbH & Co.KG, 
40 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 937 (2002). 
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institutions.”73
Both social justice scholars and neoliberal jurists have criticized 
the controversial rulings of Gonzaléz, Commission v. France, and 
Leitner.  Even though these jurists have opposite political views on the 
goals of European integration, they both condemn the ECJ for making 
decisions that, in their eyes, should be left to the legislature rather than 
courts.  Social justice advocates address questions concerning 
distributive justice and the shrinking welfare state in the EU, while 
neoliberal advocates are committed to efficiency goals and limited 
social intervention in order to promote economic life and fairness.  
However, paradoxically, they both espouse similar institutional 
competence arguments to evaluate the ECJ and to delegitimate the role 
of courts in favor of legislatures. 
The aim of this article is to contextualize both the social justice 
perspective and the neoliberal view in order to offer an explanation of 
the evolution of European private law in light of wide constitutional, 
political, and comparative law changes affecting legal scholarship.  
Through an understanding of the institutional and the substantive 
evolution of European integration—from merely market to social policy 
objectives—this work traces the appearance of legitimation concerns 
that were first used by commentators on the Left around the 1980s and 
by commentators on the Right in the mid-1990s. 
By analyzing the constitutional changes in the EU, the article 
shows how scholars have strategically adopted, over time and 
depending on the political circumstance and the debates they 
participated in, the claim of “constitutional asymmetry.”  When this 
claim is translated into the Europeanization of private law discourse, it 
enables jurists to conflate institutional competence arguments (courts 
versus legislatures; European level versus Member State level) with 
substantive arguments (efficiency versus equitable distribution; free 
markets versus social goals).  Thus, initially scholars on both the Left 
and the Right have used constitutional asymmetry claims to criticize 
ECJ judgments and delegitimate the structure of the European 
architecture. 
III. MARKET HARMONIZATION AND IDEOLOGY: CONSTITUTIONAL 
ASYMMETRY IN THE EU 
A. Building the Internal Market Through Law: Negative and Positive 
 73 Id. at 950. 
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Integration 
Economists predicted that European market integration would 
initially entail the elimination of trade barriers via market liberalization 
but that it would also later require extensive re-regulation.74  In the mid-
1980s, the Delors Commission launched its agenda for the completion 
of the internal market.75  Deepening market integration required the 
Commission to adopt wide policy action at the Community level via re-
regulation and harmonization of contract and tort law.76  In particular, 
the Community harmonized national consumer laws that, due to diverse 
regulations, impeded goods from circulating freely in the internal 
market.77  The Commission regulated sectoral areas of private law via 
directives, which obtained the necessary political support of Member 
States notwithstanding their thin legal basis.78  Initially, the 
Commission addressed the diversity of consumer regulations to assert 
the existence of an obstacle to cross-border trade, which prompted the 
use of directives as a re-regulatory device.  Later, the Commission 
became more cautious in adopting directives for cases in which the link 
between the harmonized measure and the establishment of the internal 
market was tenuous.79
In the 1990s, scholars pointed out the increasing “competence 
creep” in the Commission’s initiatives to harmonize private law.80  
They pointed to the principle of attributed competences in the EC 
Treaty art. 5, which limits the power of the Community to the 
competences conferred to it in the Treaty.81  Because there is no explicit 
 74 See WILLEM MOLLE, THE ECONOMICS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: THEORY, PRACTICE, 
POLICY (1999). 
 75 See JACQUES DELORS, OUR EUROPE (1996). 
 76 See Products Liability Directive, supra note 13; Council Directive 85/77, 1985 O.J. (L 372) 
31 [hereinafter Doorstep Selling Directive] (for the protection of consumers in respect of 
contracts negotiated away from business premises). 
 77 See STEPHEN WEATHERILL, CONSUMER LAW AND POLICY (1997). 
 78 See id. at 346; Stephen Weatherill, Reflections on the EC’s Competence to Develop a 
“European Contract Law,”13 EUR. REV. PRIVATE L. 405, 411 (2005) (“In some cases, however 
the political reality was that Member States were committed to the development of an EC 
consumer policy and, in the absence of any more appropriate legal basis in the Treaty, chose to 
‘borrow’ the competence to harmonize laws to put it in place.”). 
 79 See Stephen Weatherill, The European Commission’s Green Paper on European Contract 
Law: Context, Content and Constitutionality, 24 J. OF CONSUMER POL’Y 339, 347 (2001) 
(commenting on the legal basis of the Doorstep Selling Directive). 
 80 See J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L. J. 2403, 2405−06 (1991); 
Mark A. Pollack, Creeping Competence: The Expanding Agenda of the European Community, 14 
J. PUB. POL’Y 95 (1994). 
 81 See EC Treaty, supra note 21 (“The Community shall act within the limits of the powers 
conferred upon it by this Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein.”). 
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competence to harmonize private law rules in the Treaty, consumer 
contract directives were based on an expansive functional reading of EC 
Treaty art. 95—as a means to establish and ensure that the internal 
market functioned properly.82
However, a decade after the adoption of the Treaty of Maastricht, 
the Tobacco Advertising Judgment in 2000 illustrated the importance of 
the problem of competence creep.83  In striking down a European 
directive for the first time, the ECJ set new limits to positive integration 
through Community re-regulation.  In this case, the ECJ relied on the 
constitutional principle of attributed competences to limit the expansive 
reading of EC Treaty art. 95 by the Community decision-makers.84  
Fearing the expansion of Community competences at the expense of 
Member States, the German government challenged the legitimacy of 
the Tobacco Advertising Directive, which imposed a total ban on the 
advertisement of tobacco products.85  In questioning the legitimacy of 
the Directive before the ECJ, Germany alleged that the objective of the 
Directive was to regulate public health rather than the marketing of 
tobacco products.86  The ECJ annulled the Tobacco Advertising 
Directive for lack of a legal basis on the grounds that it was a health 
measure rather than an internal market provision.87  Because the 
Community has no competence to harmonize public health matters, 
which falls under the regulatory competence of the Member States, the 
Court ruled that the Directive was void.88
Even though negative and positive integration were institutionally 
associated with the ECJ and the Commission, respectively, this part 
shows that both phases are present simultaneously in the development 
of European law.  Rather than two alternative processes taking place in 
different periods of time, negative and positive integration took place at 
the same time through the collaboration of the ECJ with the 
Commission. 
 82 See WEATHERILL, supra note 77, at 14. 
 83 See Case C-376/98, Federal Republic of Germany v. European Parliament and Council of 
the European Union, 2000 E.C.R. I-08419 [hereinafter Tobacco Advertising Judgment]. 
 84 See Stephen Weatherill, Why Object to the Harmonization of Private Law by the EC?, 5 
EUR. REV. PRIVATE L. 633, 641−46 (2004). 
 85 See Council Directive 98/43, 1998 O.J. (L 213) 9 [hereinafter Tobacco Advertising 
Directive]. 
 86 See Marchetti & Nicola, supra note 66. 
 87 See Tobacco Advertising Judgment, supra note 83.  The Tobacco Advertising Directive 
was enacted pursuant to EC Treaty art. 95, which authorizes the approximation of national laws 
with the express objective of establishing a single European market.  See also EC Treaty, supra 
note 21, art. 95. 
 88 See Tobacco Advertising Judgment, supra note 83, para. 83. 
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Scholars depicted negative integration as comprising the initial 
phase of the internal market in the 1960s and the 1970s, in which the 
Community aimed to remove “tariffs, quantitative restrictions, and other 
barriers to trade or obstacles to free and undistorted competition.”89  
Negative integration was built into the Treaty of Rome through the 
explicit commitment to reduce tariff and non-tariff barriers and to 
enhance competition within the internal market.90
Negative integration consists of the prohibition of quantitative 
restrictions to trade under EC Treaty art. 28, a sort of European 
equivalent to the dormant commerce clause in the United States.91  The 
ECJ broadly defined national measures as those having an effect 
equivalent to quantitative restrictions.  Thus, the ECJ exercised vertical 
judicial review each time national laws created an impediment to 
interstate commerce.92  In this scenario, the ECJ played a crucial role in 
constitutionalizing the four freedoms: the free movement of goods, 
services, capital, and persons.93  By means of direct effect and 
supremacy of EC law, the Court interpreted the four freedoms to prevail 
over national legislation.94  Through vertical judicial review, which had 
“low visibility” compared to the political opposition to Community 
decision-making, the ECJ struck down national laws that created 
barriers to trade.95
Conflicts arose within the internal market when an increasing 
number of national measures conflicted with the European dormant 
commerce clause, or when businesses entering a new market denounced 
the ability of a Member State to impose technical requirements limiting 
the free movement of goods.  In response, the ECJ adopted two 
 89 See SCHARPF, supra note 14, at 45. 
 90 See id. at 50. 
 91 See EC Treaty, supra note 21, art. 28 (“Quantitative restrictions on imports and all 
measures having equivalent effect shall be prohibited between Member States.”).  For a 
comparative perspective, see Donald H. Regan, Judicial Review of Member-State Regulation of 
Trade Within a Federal or Quasi-Federal System: Protectionism and Balancing, Da Capo, 99 
MICH. L. REV. 1853, 1893 (2001). 
 92 See Case 8/74, Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville, 1974 E.C.R. 873; see also J.H.H. Weiler, 
Epilogue: Towards a Common Law of International Trade, in THE EU, THE WTO AND THE 
NAFTA 206 (J.H.H. Weiler ed., 2000) (explaining that “[r]emoving obstacles, not merely 
discrimination and protectionism is the hallmark of the true common or single market-place”). 
 93 See SCHARPF, supra note 14, at 54. 
 94 See Joseph Weiler, The Community System: the Dual Character of Supranationalism, 1982 
Y.B.  EUR. L. 257, 257−306. 
 95 See Anne-Marie Burley & Walter Mattli, Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of 
Legal Integration, 47 INT’L ORG. 41 (1993); SCHARPF, supra note 14, at 24 (explaining how the 
invisible power of the ECJ extended “the prohibitions of negative integration against national 
policy measures that could constitute barriers to free market”). 
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competing strategies.  First, by narrowly interpreting the list of 
derogations falling under EC Treaty art. 30,96 the Court clarified that 
Member States could not utilize the exemptions to serve their economic 
objectives.97  Second, in its landmark decision Cassis de Dijon, the ECJ 
created a test that conferred greater power to the Court to solve future 
disputes.98
The ECJ deployed the reasonableness test of Cassis de Dijon to 
strike down national laws that were not proportionate to their goals.  By 
balancing the (national) mandatory interests permitted under EC Treaty 
art. 30 against the (European) guarantees of free movement, the ECJ 
upheld national laws that were in fact proportionate to their goals.99  
The Cassis test did allow the ECJ to apply the European dormant 
commerce clause more broadly, but it also increased the ambiguity of 
ECJ jurisprudence.100  On the one hand, the test enabled the ECJ to 
strike down national laws that were not proportionate to the interests 
 96 See EC Treaty, supra note 21, art. 30. 
The provisions of Articles 28 and 29 shall not preclude prohibitions 
or restrictions on imports, exports or goods in transit justified on 
grounds of public morality, public policy or public security; the 
protection of health and life of humans, animals or plants; the 
protection of national treasures possessing artistic, historic or 
archaeological value; or the protection of industrial and commercial 
property.  Such prohibitions or restrictions shall not, however, 
constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised 
restriction on trade between Member States. 
Id. 
 97 See Case 113/80, Commission v. Ireland, 1981 E.C.R. 01625, para. 7. 
 98 See Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral A.G. v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein, 1979 
E.C.R. 00649, [hereinafter Cassis].  Cassis is the landmark decision concerning the free 
movement of goods.  In interpreting EC Treaty art. 28, which regulates the free movement of 
goods, the ECJ asserted its competence to assess the intrinsic reasonableness of all national 
health, safety, or environmental product regulations that could have a negative impact on cross-
border trade. 
 99 See Cinéthèque S.A. v. Federation Nationale Des Cinemas Français, Cases 60 & 61/84, 
[1986] 1985 E.C.R.; Torfaen Borough Council v. B&Q plc, Case 145/88 [1989] ECR 3851.  In 
both cases the ECJ considered national laws justified by mandatory interests and proportionate to 
their goals. 
 100 See Cassis, supra note 98, para. 8.  The ECJ laid down the test and the list of the mandatory 
interests Member States could use to justify their national legislation: 
[O]bstacles to movement within the community resulting from disparities between 
the national laws relating to the marketing of the products in question must be 
accepted in so far as those provisions may be recognized as being necessary in order 
to satisfy mandatory requirements relating in particular to the effectiveness of fiscal 
supervision, the protection of public health, the fairness of commercial transactions 
and the defense of the consumer. 
Id. 
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they were protecting; on the other hand, the Cassis test allowed the ECJ 
to expand the list of derogations under EC Treaty art. 28.101
In implementing the Cassis test, the Commission adopted the 
concept of “mutual recognition,” stating that when a product was 
lawfully marketed in one Member State, it could circulate freely in 
other Member States as well.102  By focusing on only one side of the 
test, namely that national measures restricting cross-border trade would 
be void unless they were proportionate to their aims, the Commission 
interpreted Cassis in a pro-freedom-of-movement fashion.  Mutual 
recognition alleviated the harmonization burden of the Commission, 
which could now secure the Europeanization of national regulations that 
created obstacles to trade.103  However, some scholars asserted that the 
implementation of the Cassis test by the Commission actually aimed to 
limit Member States’ regulatory powers.  In short, these scholars 
maintained that mutual recognition triggered a race to the bottom within 
the internal market by endorsing free movement at the expense of 
Member States’ welfare legislation, thus promoting European consumer 
choice over national social goals.104
Negative integration left a need for a supplementary positive 
contribution by the Community to the harmonization of Member States’ 
laws.105  In the mid-1980s the Community harmonized door-to-door 
sales and product liability rules.106  By the end of the 1980s, numerous 
consumer contracts directives created a body of EC consumer policy, 
 101 See Case 463/01, Commission v. Federal Republic of Germany, 2004 E.C.R. I-11705; Case 
112/00, Eugen Schmidberger Internationale Transporte Planzuge v. Republik Österreich, 2003 
E.C.R.. I-5659. 
 102 See Communication from the Commission Concerning the Consequences of the Judgment 
Given by the Court of Justice on 20 February 1979 in case 120/78, 1980 O.J. C 256/2 (Mar. 10 
1980). 
 103 See Kenneth A. Armstrong, Mutual Recognition, in THE LAW OF THE SINGLE EUROPEAN 
MARKET 225 (Catherine Barnard & Joanne Scott eds., 2002) (defining three dimensions of the 
policy evolution of the concept of mutual recognition). 
 104 See SCHARPF, supra note 14; WEATHERILL, supra note 77, at 10-11.  In the 1980s the ECJ 
deployed the rhetoric of the active European consumer who shops and enters into contracts across 
Member States.  This became a powerful image in order to eliminate national regulations, which, 
according to the Court, limited the free circulation of goods and were protectionist measures 
aimed at protecting national economies rather than protecting consumers. 
 105 See Giandomenico Majone, The Rise of Statutory Regulation in Europe, in REGULATING 
EUROPE 58 (Giandomenico Majone, ed., 1996).  Similar to environmental protection, consumer 
regulation included hundreds of pieces of legislation, but as Majone puts it, “while the first 
directives were for the most part concerned with product regulation, and hence could be justified 
by the need to prevent that national standards would create non-tariff barriers to the free 
movement of goods, later directives increasingly stressed process regulation . . . and thus aimed 
explicitly at environmental rather than free-trade objectives.”  Id. 
 106 See Doorstep Selling Directive, supra note 76; Products Liability Directive, supra note 13. 
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which was expressly included under the competence or jurisdiction of 
the Community in the Maastricht Treaty in 1992.107  Even though these 
directives regulated consumer contracts, their goal was the 
establishment and functioning of the internal market, based on EC 
Treaty art. 95, rather than the creation of a body of EC consumer policy 
under EC Treaty art. 153.108  Jurists both criticized and acclaimed these 
directives, which in certain contexts lowered and in other contexts 
raised national standards of protection.109
Positive integration led jurists to start questioning the relation 
between European constitutionalism and the harmonization of private 
law.  Despite the fact that the Community had no explicit competence to 
harmonize private law, by the end of the 1990s there was a consistent 
body of European contract law that, according to the Commission, only 
served the goal of efficient market integration rather than other social 
goals.110  Moreover, in 2001, the Commission envisaged among other 
things, the possibility of adopting a uniform European contract code, 
which became central to scholarly debates.111
In these debates, jurists questioned the competences of the 
Community to regulate private law in order to avoid ultra vires acts 
annulled by the ECJ.112  To assert the competence of the Community to 
harmonize a particular private law rule, the Commission often selects 
EC Treaty art. 95 as a legal basis because it is a broad provision for the 
 107 See EC Treaty, supra note 21, art. 153; WEATHERILL, supra note 77 (describing how EC 
consumer policy constructed its identity in the shadow of fundamental constitutional omissions 
from the original treaty); Geraint Howells, Soft Law and Consumer Law, in LAW MAKING IN THE 
EUROPEAN UNION (Paul Craig & Carol Harlow eds., 1998). 
 108 From 1985 to 1999 the Commission agenda triggered seven directives on European 
contract law.  See Commission Green Paper on European Union Consumer Protection, at 7, 
COM (2001) 531 final (February 10, 2001) [hereinafter Green Paper]. 
 109 See Carla Joustra, Consumer Law, in TOWARDS A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE 140, (Arthur 
Hartkamp et. al. eds., 2d ed. 1998). 
 110 The acquis communautaire is the result of the body of directives and their common 
interpretation by the ECJ.  See Reiner Schulze, The Acquis Communautaire and the Development 
of European Contract Law, in INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS AND FORMATION OF CONTRACT IN 
THE ACQUIS COMMUNAUTAIRE 15 (Reiner Schulze et al. eds., 2003); Reiner Schulze, European 
Private Law and Existing EC Law, 19 EUR. REV. PRIVATE L. 3, 10 (2005) (explaining the 
development of a European contract acquis). 
 111 See Action Plan, supra note 31.  Jurists suggested that to adopt a European civil code the 
Community could, in theory, deploy particular legal bases or even draft an intergovernmental 
treaty.  Walter van Gerven, Communication on European Contract Law: Codifying European 
Private Law, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/fair_bus_pract/cont_law/comments/5.5.pdf 
(last visited Dec. 6, 2007); Walter van Gerven, Bringing (Private) Laws Closer to Each Other at 
the European Level (Jan. 2005), available at 
http://www.law.kuleuven.ac.be/ccle/cv.php?id=WVG (last visited Dec. 6, 2007). 
 112 See Tobacco Advertising Judgment, supra note 83. 
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establishment and functioning of the internal market.  However, 
disgruntled minorities, namely Member States unhappy with an EU 
directive or a regulation, increasingly challenge before the ECJ 
Community acts adopted through the majority voting by asserting that 
they lack a valid legal basis.  In the Tobacco Advertising Judgment, the 
ECJ for the first time annulled a directive because it lacked a legal 
basis.  In that judgment, the Court also elaborated a test to determine 
when EC Treaty art. 95 can be asserted as a legal basis for Community 
acts.113  The ECJ made clear that the Community does not have a 
general power to regulate the internal market.  Rather in order to 
harmonize a specific legal issue, the Commission needs to show that 
different national regulations have created a significant distortion of 
competition that hinders the free movement of goods.114  As a result, the 
Commission has become more cautious in its harmonization proposals, 
which must be based on relevant hard data demonstrating that 
disparities in national contract laws create market failures or obstacles 
to competition.115  As scholars have pointed out, the competence creep 
resulted in a heightened burden of proof for the Commission’s 
regulatory initiatives on European private law.116
Moreover, jurists also questioned the preemption of national laws 
by European directives and the shift of the ECJ and the Commission 
toward a maximal approach to harmonization.  While the Commission 
can determine the type of harmonization adopted by a directive, which 
is then amended or adopted as a result of the political compromise 
between the Council and the EP,117 the actual level of harmonization is 
 113 Id.  EC Treaty, supra note 21, art. 230 specifies four grounds of review for community 
acts: 
The Court of Justice shall review the legality of acts adopted jointly by the European 
Parliament and the Council, of acts of the Council, of the Commission and of the 
ECB, other than recommendations and opinions, and of acts of the European 
Parliament intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties. It shall for this 
purpose have jurisdiction in actions brought by a Member State, the European 
Parliament, the Council or the Commission on grounds of lack of competence, 
infringement of an essential procedural requirement, infringement of this Treaty or 
of any rule of law relating to its application, or misuse of powers. 
Id. 
 114 See Tobacco Advertising Judgment, supra note 83, paras. 106-8; A.G. Opinion, supra note 
43, paras. 82—98. 
 115 See Com. on Contract Law, supra note 30; see also Stephen Weatherill, The Commission’s 
Options for Developing EC Consumer Protection and Contract Law: Assessing the Constitutional 
Basis 13 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 497 (2002). 
 116 See Weatherill, supra note 79; Armin Von Bogdandy & Jurgen Bast, The European 
Union’s Vertical Order of Competences: The Current Law and Proposal for its Reform 39 
COMMON MARKET L. REV. 227 (2002). 
 117 See Van Gerven, supra note 21, 508−12 (explaining how the Commission combined the 
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often unclear from the text, and the ECJ therefore is called upon to 
interpret the directive.  Recently, ECJ jurisprudence and the 
Commission’s initiatives on European contract law have favored a 
maximal approach to harmonization, which allows no derogation by 
Member State laws; thus, the directive completely preempts the field.118  
In contrast, a minimal harmonization approach allows Member States to 
maintain more stringent rules than the ones set by the directive.119  The 
Commission’s justification for maximal harmonization is to further 
market integration that will on the one hand increase the coherence of 
existent acquis communautaire,120 while on the other hand, it will 
benefit both businesses and consumers by ensuring legal certainty in 
contractual transactions.121  In addressing this regulatory shift, scholars 
are highly divided between advocating for maximal harmonization, 
because it will lead to a more integrated and efficient common market, 
and advocating against maximum harmonization, because it will likely 
lower, rather than increase, national standards of protection.122
In describing European integration, scholars associate negative 
integration with the constitutionalization of free movement via ECJ 
adjudication, whereas they associate positive integration with European 
re-regulation via the legislative initiatives of the Commission.  But, in 
fact, both the ECJ and the Commission have been jointly involved in 
both positive and negative integration.  In order to legitimize 
Community action in the eyes of the Member States, cooperation 
between the ECJ and the Commission is necessary to assure the 
implementation of EC law and to strengthen Community trends towards 
centralization or decentralization. 
As illustrated earlier, a striking example of this supranational 
cooperation that centralized and strengthened Community action vis à 
vis the Member States took place in the mid-1970s with the creation of 
the Cassis test by the ECJ, which was subsequently adopted by the 
different harmonization methods in the various fields). 
 118 See Gonzaléz, supra note 43; Jens Karsten & Gosta Petri, Towards a Handbook on 
European Contract Law and Beyond: The Commission’s 2004 Communication “European 
Contract Law and The Revision of the Acquis: The Way Forward,” 28 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 31, 
32−33 (2005). 
 119 See Case C-11/92, The Queen v. Sec’y of State for Health, 1993 E.C.R. I-03545. 
 120 The acquis communataire in a particular legal field encompasses all EC law sources 
stemming from the treaty, community acts (regulations, directives, or communications), and case 
law from the ECJ and the Court of First Instance (CFI).  See Reiner Schulze, European Private 
Law and Existing EC Law, 1 EUR. REV. PRIVATE L. 3, 10 (2005). 
 121 See Action Plan, supra note 31. 
 122 See Thomas Wilhelmsson, The Abuse of the “Confident Consumer” as a Justification of 
EC Consumer Law, 27 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 317 (2004). 
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Commission.  According to the Cassis test, any national regulation 
hindering cross-border trade must be justified by a mandatory interest of 
the state and be proportionate to its regulatory aim.123  In the aftermath 
of Cassis, the Commission adopted the principle of mutual recognition, 
which entailed the automatic harmonization of legal standards.  Thus, in 
adopting the Cassis test, the Commission, together with the ECJ, was 
pursuing a Community centralizing agenda. 
Another example of this joint cooperation emerged in the mid-
1980s with the distinction elaborated by the ECJ in France v. Keck and 
Mithouard.  This decision influenced the Commission’s regulatory 
initiatives.  In light of Keck the Commission initiated a new 
decentralization trend, both in its legislative initiatives as well as its 
executives ones, aimed at restraining Community action vis à vis the 
Member States.124  In Keck, the ECJ created a distinction between 
“product requirements,” which fall under the scrutiny of the EC Treaty 
art. 28, and “selling arrangements,” which do not fall under the ECJ’s 
scrutiny.  The distinction rests on the different regulatory nature of the 
two.  In characterizing selling arrangements as a neutral regulatory 
device, the ECJ allowed Member States to regulate the modalities of 
sales because, according to the Court, these did not directly affect 
interstate sales.  Thus, selling arrangements were left to the discretion of 
 123 Following Cassis, the Commission interpreted the ECJ holding as advancing the principle 
of mutual recognition, entailing the automatic harmonization of legal standards.  See EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION, GUIDE TO IMPLEMENTATION OF DIRECTIVES BASED ON A NEW APPROACH AND A 
GLOBAL APPROACH (2000), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/newapproach/legislation/guide/document/1999_1282_en.pdf. 
[The Cassis case] provides the key elements for mutual recognition.  The effect of 
this case is as follows. 
Products legally manufactured or marketed in one country should in principle move 
freely throughout the Community where such product meet equivalent levels of 
protection to those imposed by the Member State of exportation and where they are 
marketed in the territory of the exported country. 
In absence of Community measures, Member States are free to legislate in their own 
territory. 
Barriers to trade, which result from differences between national legislations, may 
only be accepted, if national measures: 
are necessary to satisfy mandatory requirements (such as health, safety, 
environmental and consumer protection); 
serve a legitimate purpose justifying the breach of the principle of free movement of 
goods; and 
can be justified with regard to the legitimate purpose and are proportionate with the 
aims. 
Id. at 7. 
 124 See Case C-267/91, France v. Keck and Mitouard, 1993 E.C.R. I-06097; Nobert Reich, The 
“November Revolution” of the European Court of Justice: Keck, Merng and Audi Revisited, 31 
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 459 (1994). 
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local regulatory interventions.  Similarly, the Commission adopted the 
Keck decentralizing strategy in its proposals to harmonize product 
requirements by letting the Member States exercise regulatory control 
over their selling agreements.125
These examples show that both negative and positive integration 
strategies have been part of the Community agenda pursued jointly by 
the ECJ and the Commission, despite their different powers and 
institutional capacities.  Moreover, it shows that, as predicted by 
scholars, the problem of the “competence creep” or lack of legal basis 
should be managed by both the Commission and the ECJ jointly.  In 
fact, the ECJ made clear in the Tobacco Advertising judgment that 
Community Acts proposed by the Commission under a broad provision 
of the EC Treaty, such as art. 95, need to be substantiated by further 
evidence.126  In addition to showing a legal basis for harmonization 
efforts in a particular area, the Commission will have to show that the 
different national legislative provisions have created real obstacles to 
competition.  In this way disgruntled minorities will be less likely to 
bring a Community Act for horizontal judicial review before the ECJ 
and the Court less likely to annul it. 
B. A Genealogy of Constitutional Asymmetry in European Legal 
Consciousness 
Scholars have divided the process of integration into two 
competing phases.  The first phase of negative integration entailed 
market-making strategies through EC competition law and the 
constitutionalization of the four freedoms (goods, services, capital, and 
workers).127  A second phase of positive integration entailed 
Community re-regulation through market-correcting strategies.  For 
some scholars, the process of negative integration advanced by 
supranational institutions consisted mostly of market deregulation 
 125 See Tobacco Advertising Judgment, supra note 83, paras. 106−13; see also Marchetti & 
Nicola, supra note 66 (discussing the follow up of the Tobacco Advertising Directive and the new 
legislative initiatives of the Community). 
 126 See WEATHERILL, supra note 77, at 14.  On the “competence creep” in the EU, see 
Pollack, supra note 80. 
 127 Negative integration has been achieved mostly by judicial fiat.  The ECJ through vertical 
judicial review has been voiding domestic laws clashing with the free movement provisions of the 
EC Treaty because of their protectionist goals.  Many authors have linked negative integration 
with one of the initial ECJ decisions on free movement of goods.  In Dassonville, in the early 
1970s, the ECJ shifted the burden of proof to the Member States to demonstrate that their 
domestic laws were not in conflict with the free movement of goods provision of Article 28 EC 
Treaty..  See Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville, supra note 25. 
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through the elimination of trade barriers.  Under the pressure of 
negative integration, Member States managed to preserve their national 
welfare states, but their capacity to maintain public interest regulations 
through national environmental, public health, and consumer safety 
laws was severely limited by the pressure of negative integration.128
Initially, positive integration, or market-correcting measures, 
consisted in re-regulation at the Community level, mostly via directives, 
aimed at the narrow goal of establishing a functioning internal market.  
Later, in 1992, the Treaty of Maastricht expanded EC competences to 
regulate consumer and environmental protection to maintain high 
standards of protection to guarantee the safety and public interest of 
European citizens.129  Because of these constitutional changes, the 
Community has broader competences that go beyond the mere internal 
market scope.  In noticing this change, scholars who are concerned with 
national welfare regimes maintain that a constitutional asymmetry 
pervades the EU institutional arrangement.  Thus, the legitimacy of the 
Community is at stake, and the interrelation between economic 
globalization and European integration through judicial activism leads 
to the “weakening of political legitimacy in Western Europe.”130
According to Fritz Scharpf, while negative integration led to the 
establishment of the internal market, positive integration or market-
correcting strategies were “limited by the need to achieve action 
consensus among a wide range of divergent national and group 
interests.”131  This is what Sharpf calls the “decoupling of economic 
integration and social protection issues which has characterized the real 
process of European integration . . . .”132  Likewise, jurists addressing 
European law, and in particular the process of harmonization of private 
law, argued that positive integration could not always fill the regulatory 
gap left by negative integration in the EU.133  Most importantly, the 
 128 See 1 Welfare and Work in the Open Economy, in FROM VULNERABILITY TO 
COMPETITIVENESS (Fritz W. Scharpf & Vivien A. Schmidt eds., 2000); THE NEW POLITICS OF 
THE WELFARE STATE (Paul Pierson ed., 2001). 
 129 See EC Treaty, supra note 21, art. 95 (ex art. 100A), art. 152-3 (expanding the 
competences of the EU for consumer protection and public health). 
 130 See SCHARPF, supra note 14, at 2; see also HANS-W. MICKLITZ, THE POLITICS OF 
JUDICIAL CO-OPERATION IN THE EU: SUNDAY TRADING, EQUAL TREATMENT AND GOOD FAITH 
17 (2005). 
 131 Id. at 71. 
 132 Fritz W. Scharpf, The European Social Model: Coping with the Challenges of Diversity, in  
INTEGRATION IN AN EXPANDING EUROPEAN UNION 109, 110 (Joseph H. H. Weiler et al. eds., 
2003). 
 133 See Daniela Caruso, Limits of the Classic Method: Positive Action in the European Union 
After the New Equality Directives, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 331, 378 (2003) (claiming that “[f]or 
many years, this test allowed the ECJ to strike down many forms of state regulation as 
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constitutional asymmetry consisted of the fact that while the 
harmonization of the internal market was based largely on economic 
rationales, social protection initiatives were to be left either to the 
Member States or to difficult compromises in European policies.134
In providing a genealogy of the scholarly claim that the EU is 
pervaded by a constitutional asymmetry when compared to the 
constitutional arrangements of its Member States, the goal is to depart 
from questions of origins or foundations and instead to focus on 
accidental events, historical facts, and influential scholarship that 
shaped the discourse on the Europeanization of private law.135
During the 1980s, scholars were familiar with the notion of a 
“democratic deficit” intrinsic to the Community decision-making 
processes.  According to Joseph Weiler, the democratic deficit could be 
traced back to the Treaty of Rome in 1957, which gave power to the 
executive branch (the Commission) at the expense of the legislative 
branch (the EP).136  In Weiler’s view, supranational structural 
deficiencies were aggravated by two elements.  First, the dual character 
of supranationalism revealed that legal, instead of political, processes 
fueled European integration.  Second, the lack of democratic legitimacy 
was reflected in the activism of a quasi-federal judiciary and the limited 
powers of the EP.137  Thus, in the aftermath of the Maastricht Treaty in 
1992, the “transformation of Europe” led to a paradoxical situation.  
While political scientists speculated that intergovernmental decision-
making slowed down European integration, lawyers, observing the 
federal judiciary, perceived that European integration “moved 
powerfully ahead.”138  The widespread concern among scholars was 
that a quasi-federal judiciary was driving European integration and 
incompatible with the Treaty of Rome. Such holdings resulted, to varying degrees, in the 
disempowerment of local governments.  The ensuing normative vacuum would at times, but not 
always, be filled by Community regulation”). 
 134 See SCHARPF, supra note 14, at 59. 
 135 See Michel Foucault, Nietzsche, Genealogy, History, in LANGUAGE, COUNTER-MEMORY, 
PRACTICE: SELECTED ESSAYS AND INTERVIEWS BY MICHEL FOUCAULT 139 (Donald F. 
Bouchard ed., 1977). 
 136 See J.H.H. WEILER, THE CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE. ‘DO THE NEW CLOTHES HAVE AN 
EMPEROR?’ AND OTHER ESSAYS ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION (1999).  Weiler explains that the 
notion of a “democratic deficit” reinforced the fear that the Community would increasingly 
decide on issues that are perceived to be symbolically of national competence, thus triggering 
reactions from French or Germans citizens that the Brussels bureaucrats tell us “how to run our 
lives.”  In Weiler’s view, at the core of the democratic deficit, were European policies ramifying 
beyond the economic sphere and decision-making processes with low accountability.  Id. at 77. 
 137 See Joseph Weiler, Community, Member States and European Integration, 21 J. COMMON 
MT. STUDS. 39, 51−52 (1982). 
 138 See Weiler, supra note 80, at 2410. 
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leaving behind political and democratically elected bodies, resulting in 
increased asymmetry between law and politics in the EU. 
In the mid-1990s, Fritz Scharpf elaborated further on the idea of 
asymmetry between European law and politics by analyzing the patterns 
of economic integration.  He argued that negative integration had 
prevailed in Europe at the expense of positive integration.  As a result, 
negative integration constrained national regulatory capacities through 
the legal prohibitions contained in the Treaty and the downward 
pressure of regulatory competition.139  According to Scharpf, there is a 
fundamental “constitutional asymmetry” between policies promoting 
market efficiencies and those promoting social protection and equality.  
These two groups of policies are not competing on a similar 
constitutional level.140  European integration has created a relationship 
between economic and social policies that “has become asymmetric[,] 
as economic policies have been progressively Europeanized, while 
social protection policies [have] remained at the national level.”141
By referring to these scholarly interpretations of European 
integration, jurists perceived the process of harmonization as having a 
deregulatory bias, enabling European bureaucrats and, especially, 
judges to foster market deregulation at the expense of national social 
provisions.  When transferred to the realm of European private law, the 
constitutional asymmetry claim enabled jurists to make institutional 
competence arguments when commenting on ECJ judgments.  European 
private lawyers who disagreed with the decisions of the Court argued 
for greater deference to domestic courts.  Jurists made constitutional 
asymmetry claims about the EU to communicate two different concepts.  
For some, the asymmetry claim stood for the predominance of free-
market concerns over national social goals; for others, the asymmetry 
claim stood for the imbalance between a powerful ECJ and a weak 
Community legislature. 
When these claims were translated into the private law debate, 
some jurists envisioned contract law as a set of market-oriented 
informational measures, aiming to extend party autonomy.  They 
 139 See SCHARPF, supra note 14, at 59-60.  Through the “constitutionalization” of competition 
law, the ECJ launched a successful “legal attack on the privileged status of the service 
public . . . on the grounds that the authorizing legislation was in violation of competition law.”  In 
Scharpf’s view, the liberalization of EC policies has “eliminated the possibility of using public-
sector industries as an employment buffer,” therefore “European legal constrains have greatly 
reduced the capacity of national governments to influence growth and employment in the 
economies for whose performance they are politically accountable.”  See also Scharpf, supra note 
132, at 648. 
 140 Scharpf, supra note 132, at 646. 
 141 Id. at 665-66. 
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welcomed the harmonization of contract law characterized by negative 
integration.142  In contrast, other jurists who conceived of contract law 
as a redistributive tool that limited individual freedom argued in favor 
of a national resistance to Europeanization, thus attacking 
harmonization to promote national private law traditions.143
C. Democratic Legitimacy in Constitutional Adjudication 
In addressing ECJ adjudication, European jurists have put forward 
democratic legitimacy concerns by adopting recurrent legal 
dichotomies, which characterize the constitutional asymmetry claim 
(free market versus social goals; European level versus Member State 
level; and law versus politics).  Jurists have pointed out the dangers of 
European judicial lawmaking, which tends to prevail over national 
legislation, over Community acts, and even over national judiciaries.  
They have put forward two different democratic legitimacy arguments 
regarding the ECJ’s vertical and horizontal power of judicial review and 
a third one concerning the power of the ECJ to interpret directives that 
harmonize private law rules. 
First, European jurists claimed that the constitutionalization of the 
European dormant commerce clause, namely EC Treaty art. 28, enabled 
the ECJ, through vertical judicial review, to strike down national 
legislation protecting consumers, the environment, and public health.144  
They argued that the ECJ will generally annul domestic regulations 
democratically approved by national parliaments by means of counter-
majoritarian rulings.  Moreover, European jurists claimed that, in 
balancing the free movement of goods and services against national 
social goals, the ECJ tends to constantly favor free trade over local 
interests.145  For instance, in Gambelli, the ECJ interpreted the Treaty 
 142 See Jürgen Basedow, A Common Contract Law for the Common Market, 33 COMMON 
MKT. L. REV. 1169 (1996); Von Ernst-Joachim Mestmäker, On the Legitimacy of European Law, 
58 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT 615 (1994). 
 143 See Caruso, supra note 16; Hugh Collins, Good Faith in European Contract Law, 14 
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 229, 230−31 (1994). 
 144 See MADURO, supra note 26 (highlighting that the ECJ could interpret EC Treaty art. 28 to 
create refined criteria to prevent State protectionism or to rely on the general notion of a 
European economic constitution, which was “built on the free market, open competition, and a 
particular view of the kinds of regulation that are acceptable”). 
 145 See Cassis, supra note 98; Case 212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen, 
1999 E.C.R. I-01459 (1999).  In the Centros case, Danish authorities denied the freedom of 
establishment (art. 43 TEU) to Centros, a private limited company registered in the UK that was 
trying to circumvent national rules concerning the paying-up of minimal capital.  The ECJ ruled 
that this Danish provision is contrary to the free movement principle.  Similar to the mutual 
recognition principle, Centros establishes that, since the company was legally incorporated in 
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provisions on the free movement of services to favor the free trade 
interest over the national one.146  Mr. Gambelli, who took bets from 
Italian gamblers on sports events, transmitted these data electronically 
to a UK betting company.  His activity constituted a fraud under Italian 
law, which requires that those operating gambling activity on sporting 
events obtain a state granted license.  The ECJ ruled that Italian 
administrative and criminal rules were not proportionate to the 
mandatory interest they sought to protect.  Thus, the Italian regulations 
created a barrier to providing cross-border services that was 
incompatible with the principle of free movement of services included 
in the Treaty.  In short, the ECJ ruling annulled two national provisions 
that had been democratically approved by a national parliament. 
A second democratic legitimacy claim addresses the ECJ’s power 
of horizontal judicial review as deployed in the Tobacco Advertising 
Judgment to annul a directive.147  After the judgment, the democratic 
legitimacy concern with EC law prevailing over European politics 
increased exponentially.  Jurists have highlighted how horizontal 
judicial review enables disgruntled legislative minorities (i.e., national 
governments) to bring claims against Community institutions before the 
ECJ, who then strikes down directives adopted through the co-decision 
procedure.148  Because of the administrative legal nature of the Treaty, 
the ECJ has broad power to exercise horizontal judicial review over 
Community legislation.149  In the aftermath of the Tobacco Advertising 
Judgment, scholars drew parallels between ECJ adjudication and the 
Rehnquist Court in the United States, in that the latter struck down 
federal legislation adopted by Congress under the Commerce Clause in 
the well-known U.S. Supreme Court cases Lopez and Morrison.150
accordance with the law of another Member State (UK), it has the right to register its branch in 
Denmark.  Id. para. 7. 21. 
 146 See Case C-243/01, Criminal Proceedings against Piergiorgio Gambelli, 2003 E.C.R. I-
13031 (proving the consistency of the ECJ jurisprudence on the four freedoms). 
 147 See Tobacco Advertising Judgment, supra note 83.  In annulling the Directive on the 
ground that the ban on tobacco advertising regulated public health instead of the internal market, 
the Court held that the ban fell under the competence of Member States and not of the 
Community legislature. 
 148 See WEATHERILL, supra note 79. 
 149 See GEORGE A. BERMANN, ET. AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 
LAW (1993); Peter Lindseth, Democratic Legitimacy and the Administrative Character of 
Supranationalism: the Example of the European Community, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 628 (1999) 
(addressing EU law in relation to French administrative law). 
 150 See Geraint G. Howells, Federalism in the USA and EC—The Scope for Harmonized 
Legislative Activity Compared, 5 EUR. REV. PRIVATE L. 601, 620 (2002) (comparing the Tobacco 
Advertising Judgment to the U.S. Supreme Court decisions on the limits of the Commerce 
Clause, Lopez and Morrison: “Within this area of exclusive Community competence it is to be 
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A third democratic legitimacy concern addresses the excessive use 
of preliminary ruling procedures by domestic courts in referring 
questions of EC law interpretation directly to the ECJ.151  Some jurists 
maintain that this process undermines the role of national courts, while 
the ECJ obtains more power to judicially define contractual rules.  Thus, 
scholars have suggested that national courts be more cautious in 
referring questions to the ECJ through preliminary rulings.  Member 
States’ domestic courts have adopted this cautious approach, in 
particular the courts in Scandinavia.152
Ultimately, ECJ commentators effectively claimed that these three 
different types of democratic legitimacy arguments showed that there 
was a “constitutional asymmetry” in the EU framework.  In fact, rather 
than focusing on national resistance, local discontent, and social 
struggles against European integration, legal elites all over Europe 
began a sophisticated legal dialogue with Luxemburg and Brussels.  
Rather than an open discussion exposing federal, socio-economic, and 
ideological disagreements among the different legal elites, the European 
legal elites exposed their disagreements over democratic legitimacy.  
This moderation effect of the legal dialogue between national elites and 
European judges was successful in channeling the conflicts and 
constraining the debates to federal adjudication, judicial law making, 
and institutional competences.153  
IV. THE PHASES AND THE POLITICS OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW 
A. Three Phases in the Europeanization of Contract Law 
From the mid-1980s until today, three different scholarly phases 
have characterized the debate on the harmonization of private law.  
Each period reflects a change in the methodologies as well as in the 
normative aspirations of lawyers who have shaped the field of European 
private law.  The first phase from 1985 to 1992 was characterized by 
hoped that the Court does not become too interventionist both because it is not well equipped to 
determine what is needed to create the internal market and because as protection is a legitimate 
objective, the level of that protection is best determined by the political procedures laid down in 
the Treaty.”). 
 151 See EC Treaty, supra note 21, art. 234. 
 152 This phenomenon became relevant in Sweden when the Commission asked the government 
to press courts to refer preliminary questions to the ECJ.  See Brochs Redovisningsbyra KB, 
http://www.broch.se/html/sve/news/2004/news6.htm (last visited November 10, 2007). 
 153 See KENNEDY, supra note 2, at 220-21. 
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market functionalism in the harmonization of private law rules.154  The 
second phase from 1992 to 2000 was characterized by three different 
constitutional understandings of European integration: the European 
economic constitution, constitutional asymmetry, and deliberate 
supranationalism.155  Finally, the third phase of European contract law 
from 2001 to the present has been characterized by a deep ideological 
divide between neoliberal and social justice advocates156 as well as by a 
new trend in European scholarship that I will call Deliberative 
Supranationalism or New Governance advocacy. 
During the first phase, the consolidation of the internal market led 
the Community to harmonize private law through sectoral directives in 
the areas of consumer law.  By deepening market integration, the 
Commission harmonized contract and tort law as a functional tool for 
the completion of the single market.  Likewise, jurists addressed 
contract law as a technical tool, which was functional to the 
Commission’s agenda of realizing an efficient internal market. 
In this phase, scholarly projects shared a similar technical approach 
to the harmonization of private law.  However, methodologically they 
oscillated between advocating for the unification of contract law rules, 
which was merely functional to the achievement of the internal market, 
and adopting a more sophisticated comparative law methodology to 
unearth the “common core” of European private law.157
In 1992, the Treaty of Maastricht created the European Union and 
expanded Community competences beyond merely economic activities.  
This constitutional transformation inaugurated the second phase of the 
European private law debate.  Paradoxically, in expanding the 
functional capability of the Community, the Commission and the ECJ 
showed greater uncertainty about the Community re-regulation resulting 
in the decentralization approach of Keck.158  Towards the end of the 
 154 See PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW: PARTS I AND II (Ole Lando & Hugh Beale 
eds., 2000). 
 155 For the economic constitution approach, see Jürgen Basedow, supra note 142; for the 
constitutional asymmetry approach, see Daniela Caruso, supra note 133; for the deliberative 
supranationalism approach, see Christian Joerges, The Challenges of Europeanization in the 
Realm of Private Law: A Plea for New Legal Discipline, 14 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L LAW 149 
(2004). 
 156 See Fernanda Nicola & Ugo Mattei, A ‘Social Dimension’ in European Private Law? The 
Call for Setting a Progressive Agenda, 41 New Eng. L. Rev. 1 (2006).  This phase will be 
explained in detail in Part IV; however, for Regulatory Competition advocates, see Van den 
Bergh, supra note 8. 
 157 For an insightful analysis of both approaches, see Elena Ioriatti, A Methodological 
Approach for a European Restatement of Contract Law, 3 GLOBAL JURIST TOPICS 1 (2003), 
available at http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1107&context=gj. 
 158 See Paul Craig, The Evolution of the Single Market, in THE LAW OF THE SINGLE 
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1990s, scholars increasingly accused the Community of exceeding its 
capacity through a “functional creep.”159  They often highlighted that 
the Commission lacked the competence to regulate private law.160
In this phase, scholars involved in the Europeanization debate 
expressed two major views.  On the one hand, some jurists associated 
with a neoliberal private law tradition claimed that a European 
economic constitution should attempt to harmonize private law.  In their 
view, an economic constitution, comprising private law rules, would 
enhance private autonomy and contractual freedom as well as create 
better procedural guarantees for efficient markets.161  On the other hand, 
jurists who claimed that the EU was pervaded by a constitutional 
asymmetry urged national lawyers, judges, and politicians to resist the 
harmonization of private law.  According to these progressive lawyers, 
ECJ jurisprudence reflected the free-market bias of the Commission’s 
bureaucrats.  Both views, despite their opposite political positions, 
reinforced the widespread claim that while the European level was 
connected to free markets, the national level was connected to social 
goals. 
This second phase ended with the Tobacco Advertising Judgment 
in which the ECJ, for the first time, invalidated a directive because it 
lacked a legal basis.162  This decision produced a shift in consciousness 
among jurists because the Commission was successfully challenged by 
a Member State.  For the first time, it became clear that Community-
wide social policies, environmental laws, or a consumer protection 
agenda would be challenged by Member States concerned that such 
polices encroached on their powers. 
The third phase of European private law began in July 2001, when 
the Commission published the White paper on European Governance163 
EUROPEAN MARKET 27 (Catherine Barnard & Joanne Scott eds., 2002). 
 159 See Marchetti & Nicola, supra note 66. 
 160 See Weatherill, supra note 79. 
 161 See Jürgen Basedow, Codification of Private Law in the European Union: The Making of a 
Hybrid, 1 EUR. REV. PRIVATE L. 35 (2001); Joustra, supra note 109 (discussing the possibilities 
of harmonization of national consumer law regimes into European consumer law). 
 162 In curtailing the action of the Community legislature, the ECJ interpreted EC Treaty art. 
95, which allows harmonization of laws only for market functioning measures.  In citing an 
insufficient connection between the market-building process and the total ban of advertising of 
tobacco products, the court considered the directive a disguised public health measure, which the 
Community cannot regulate since it falls under the exclusive competence of Member States, as 
mandated by EC Treaty art. 152.  See Weatherill, supra note 115, at 504 (explaining that in 
annulling the Tobacco Advertising Directive, the ECJ reaffirmed that “there is not carte blanche 
to harmonize national laws, but rather only a power to achieve defined ends”). 
 163 See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, EUROPEAN GOVERNANCE: A WHITE 
PAPER, COM (2001) 428 final (July 25, 2001). 
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and the Green Paper on European Contract Law.164  In both cases the 
Commission sought to involve a larger public, such as academics and 
stakeholders, in the process of the re-regulation and harmonization of 
contract law.  These documents expressed the anxieties surrounding the 
democratic accountability of European institutions and highlighted the 
need for more effective and transparent regulatory strategies.  The 
Green Paper signaled that the Commission intended to move ahead with 
the harmonization of contract law after triggering wider public debates 
and academic involvement.  Jurists were now expressly invited by the 
Commission to participate in the debate regarding the desirability of 
further harmonization of private law, and in its latest document the 
European Commission decided to go forward with its project of creating 
a sort of restatement for European Contract law.165
The shift in consciousness produced by these European 
transformations triggered some skepticism among lawyers committed to 
the economic constitution.  Moreover, during this phase jurists began 
prominently deploying United States economic analyses.  Thus, 
Regulatory Competition advocates began arguing in terms that were 
radically different from their predecessors.  They asserted that diversity 
of legal rules, rather than uniformity, was more efficient in achieving a 
competitive internal market.  In contrast, jurists who had before 
opposed the harmonization of contract law began addressing social 
justice in European contract law, insisting that the Commission adopt a 
distributive justice perspective in the process of the harmonization of 
private law.166
B. Market Functionalism and Uniformity in Contract Law 
In 1999, Professors Ole Lando and Hugh Beale published the 
Principles of European Contract Law (PECL).  The so-called Lando 
Commission sought to contribute, via PECL, to the unification of 
European contract law that had been initiated by the Commission.167  
The Lando principles represented an important model for a uniform 
body of contract law and provided a basis for future codification.  In 
advocating for uniform contract laws, the Lando Commission used a 
 164 See Green Paper, supra note 108. 
 165 Karstan & Perti, supra note 118; Dirk Staudenmayer, The Way Forward in European 
Contract Law, 2 EUR. REV. PRIVATE L. 95 (2005).   
 166 See infra Part V (analyzing the shift of consciousness of European private lawyers and the 
reception of United States law and economics). 
 167 The Lando Principles were inspired by the UNIDROIT Principles for international contract 
law adopted in 1994. 
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functionalist approach that sought to strengthen the single market by 
overcoming the obstacles to trade created by different legal regimes.168  
The PECL approach emphasized private autonomy in contractual 
obligations.  It gave a central position to the principle of freedom of 
contract and elaborated its exceptions through general clauses or 
mandatory provisions.169
PECL is emblematic of the unification of contract law in Europe, 
which reflects a broader global trend, namely post-war projects of 
harmonization through the creation of a new transnational law for 
business regulations.  In this spirit, the United Nations General 
Assembly in 1962 created the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL).170  UNCITRAL’s mission was 
to harmonize laws that impeded transnational business transactions.  
Through the drafting of international conventions, guidelines, and 
model laws, UNCITRAL sought to promote different forms of trade 
liberalization that could be adopted in flexible ways by different legal 
regimes in order to remove legal obstacles to trade.  In the realm of 
international contracts, the Vienna Convention on the International Sale 
of Goods (CISG) has been one of the most used and widely adopted 
instruments regulating the sale of goods through international contracts, 
even though some countries still refuse to become part of it and some 
practitioners have discouraged its adoption.171
More recently, the work of the International Institute for the 
Unification for Private Law (UNIDROIT) has led to the adoption of 
various model laws in the realm of international business and 
commercial law.172  In particular, in 1994, UNIDROIT published the 
Principles of International Commercial Contracts, which served to 
interpret international contract rules in international arbitration 
disputes—a sort of restatement of contracts.173  Similar to a 
 168 See Schultze, supra note 110; see also Michele Graziadei, The Functionalist Heritage, in 
COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES: TRADITIONS AND TRANSITIONS 110 (Pierre Legrand & Roderick 
Munday eds., 2003). 
 169 See COMMISSION ON EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW, THE PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN 
CONTRACT LAW art. 1:102 (1999); see also HESSELINK, supra note 7, at 111−12 (explaining that 
the regime of freedom of contract is subject to the requirements of good faith and fair dealing and 
other mandatory requirements). 
 170 See UNCITRAL, Origin, Mandate and Composition of UNICTRAL, 
http://www.uncitral.org/ (last visited Dec. 6, 2007). 
 171 Luke R. Nottage, Who’s Afraid of the Vienna Sales Convention (CISG)? A New 
Zealander’s View from Australia and Japan, 36 VIC. U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 815 (2005). 
 172 See UNIDROIT’s Achievements, www.unidroit.org/english/presentation/achievements.htm 
(last visited Dec. 6, 2007). 
 173 See UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts, 
http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/main.htm (last visited Dec. 7, 2007); see also 
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transnational lex mercatoria, at least in the view of some of its most 
influential authors, the Principles have been widely used to interpret and 
supplement both international uniform law as well as domestic law.174
In sharp contrast to these unification trends in private law, some 
European comparative lawyers departed from the PECL approach and 
sought to contribute to European scholarship and legal education by 
drawing a map of the similarities and differences emerging in private 
law regimes.175  Compared to PECL, the Common Core Project176 and 
the Casebook Project177 are methodologically more eclectic in their 
attempt to be purely descriptive and therefore to present greater 
scientific neutrality.  The goal of the Common Core is to create a 
cartography of European private law in order to highlight differences 
and commonalities emerging among different private law regimes.  The 
Casebook Project deploys the comparative methodology to shape 
European legal education.  Through rigorous examination of national 
and ECJ case law, the Casebook project aims to introduce civil lawyers 
to the analytical aspects of a case-law approach and foster a bottom-up 
approach to Europeanization.178  Both projects undertake an anti-
formalist exercise in inquiring into the application of legal doctrines.  In 
assessing the role of the national courts in shaping contract law rules, 
they maintain a cautious and at times skeptical approach towards the 
Europeanization of contract law.  While distancing themselves from the 
functionalist approach of the PECL, these European lawyers affirm their 
methodological maturity and eclecticism and emphasize their political 
neutrality, which leads them to claim of scientific reliability.179
Klaus Peter Berger, International Arbitral Practice and the UNIDROIT Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 129 (1998) (discussing the use of the 
UNIDROIT Principles in arbitration disputes). 
 174 See Michael Joachim Bonell, The UNIDROIT Principles and Transnational Law, 52 
UNIFORM L. REV. 218 (2002), available at 
http://www.unidroit.org/english/publications/review/articles/2000-2.htm. 
 175 For this distinction, see Ioriatti, supra note 157. 
 176 See The Common Core of European Private Law, in 1 PRIVATE LAW IN EUROPEAN 
CONTEXT SERIES (Mauro Bussani & Ugo Mattei eds., 2003). 
 177 See WALTER VAN GERVEN ET AL., COMMON LAW OF EUROPE CASEBOOKS: TORT LAW 
(2000). 
 178 See Walter Van Gerven, The Case-law of the European Court of Justice and National 
Courts as a Contribution to the Europeanization of Private Law, 3 EUR. REV. PRIVATE L, 367, 
374-75 (1995). 
 179 See David Kennedy, The Methods and Politics of Comparative Law, in COMPARATIVE 
LEGAL STUDIES: TRADITIONAL AND TRANSITIONS 345, 373 (Pierre Legard & Roderick Munday 
eds., 2003). 
NICOLA_ARTICLE_FINAL 5/7/2008  2:23:55 PM 
200X] TRANSATLANTICISM IN EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW 143 
 
C. Diverging Constitutional Views over Europe 
The harmonization of contract law contributed to strengthening the 
single market by ensuring a level-playing field that enhanced individual 
freedoms.  In the second phase of the Europeanization process, some 
European jurists, supporting the PECL agenda, emphasized that 
harmonization of contract law could provide greater information to 
private actors and enhance their private autonomy.180  In supporting the 
idea of a European economic constitution, a group of scholars argued in 
favor of a European codification, which would guarantee to each person 
the disposition of her individual entitlements.  For instance, Jürgen 
Basedow maintained that the notion of freedom of contract remained 
the core idea for a European codification since every person has the 
individual right to enter into a binding contract.  In his view, European 
codification strengthened economic freedoms and counterbalanced the 
growing importance of consumer regulation that undermined the basic 
values contained in the notion of freedom of contract.181  For these 
lawyers the goal of market harmonization was to remedy the market 
failure created by the disparity between commercial and non-
commercial contractual regimes, which restricted market competition 
and created information asymmetry.182  These lawyers have tied claims 
in favor of European codification to a notion of contract law as a tool 
for enhancing party autonomy rather than enhancing social values.183
These pro-harmonization lawyers have devoted great attention and 
support to legislative measures of the Commission.  However, they have 
highlighted that the Community should be careful not to undermine its 
democratic legitimacy, which is grounded in European procedures and, 
primarily, national democratic processes.184  For instance, the 
 180 See PARTY AUTONOMY AND THE ROLE OF INFORMATION IN THE INTERNAL MARKET 
(Stefan Grundman, Wolfgang Kerber & Stephen Weatherill eds., 2001). 
 181 See Basedow, supra note 161, at 35−49.  The role of contract law “is based upon the 
theoretical perception that a promise and the reliance on it is a basic behavior in human society.”  
Id. at 38. 
 182 See Stefan Grundmann, The Structure of European Contract Law, 4 EUR. REV. PRIVATE L. 
505, 518 (2001). 
 183 See Id.; Stefan Grundmann & Jules Stuyck, An Academic Green Paper on European 
Contract Law, in 2 PRIVATE LAW IN EUROPEAN CONTEXT SERIES (Stefan Grundmann & Jules 
Stuyck eds., 2002). 
 184 See Brunner v. European Union Treaty, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverwfG] [Federal 
Constitutional Court] Oct. 12, 1993, 89 BverfGE 155 (F.R.G.), translated in 1 C.M.L.R. 57 
(1994).  But see J.H.H Weiler, The State “über alles:” Demos, Telos and the German Maastricht 
Decision (New York School of Law, Working Paper No. 6/95, 1995), available at 
http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/95/9506ind.html (last visited Dec. 7, 2007); see 
generally Peter Lindseth, The Maastricht Decision Ten Years Later: Parliamentary Democracy, 
Separation of Powers and the Schmittian Interpretation Reconsidered, (European University 
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Community cannot strip European citizens of their individual rights 
conferred on them by the Treaty.185  In casting light on the procedural 
guarantees of EC law, they have advocated for a European codification 
that supports the functioning of the single market and legislative 
discretion by supranational institutions. 
Jurists who favored the harmonization of contract law often shared 
a common intellectual tradition, which can be traced back to the 
Freiburg ordo-liberal school, which also falls under the rubric of 1930s 
German neoliberalism.186  In drawing on the ordo-liberal intellectual 
tradition, jurists traced the meaning of concepts such as contractual 
freedom to the post-World War II economic compromise of the German 
social-market economy.  The ordo-liberal tradition offered the European 
integration project an influential model of legitimization through the 
notion of the “economic constitution.”187  In relying on the central 
tenets of the ordo-liberal tradition, jurists perceived the European 
economic constitution enshrined in the Treaty as a means to ensure 
greater individual autonomy within the internal market.188  In arguing in 
favor of a European codification, they were attempting to provide a 
framework of general contract rules that would ensure equal 
possibilities to all players in a free market. 
After World War II, as a reaction to totalitarian regimes and 
economic collectivism, ordo-liberalism became one of the most 
influential schools of thought among political economists and lawyers, 
whose views ranged from neoliberal to socially conservative.189  The 
aim of ordo-liberal scholars was to break with a tradition in social 
science that was highly influenced by historicism and Marxist 
relativism.190  Ordo-liberals wanted to reassert the role of individual 
action in the economic and legal disciplines and to reconcile both 
creativity and reason within their work.  In their 1936 Manifesto, Frantz 
Böhm, Wilhelm Eucken, and Grossman-Doerth asserted that in order to 
Institute, Working Paper RSC No. 2003/18, 2003), available at 
http://cadmus.iue.it/dspace/bitstream/1814/1893/1/03_18.pdf (last visited Dec. 7, 2007). 
 185 See Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker, On the Legitimacy of European Law, 58 RABELS ZEIT 615 
(1994). 
 186 See VIKTOR J. VANBERG, THE CONSTITUTION OF MARKETS: ESSAYS IN POLITICAL 
ECONOMY 37 (2001). 
 187 Id. 
 188 See Basedow, supra note 142. 
 189 See Franz Böhm et al., The Ordo Manifesto of 1936, in GERMANY’S SOCIAL MARKET 
ECONOMY: ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION (Alan Peacock & Hans Willgerodt eds., 1989); Dongsheng 
Zang, Textualism in GATT/WTO Jurisprudence: Lessons for the Constitutionalization Debate, 33 
SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 393 (2006). 
 190 See Böhm, supra note 189. 
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protect individual freedom, a polity should have an “economic 
constitution” modeled after a “general political decision as to how the 
economic life of the nation is to be structured.”191  The economic 
constitution should provide a minimal regulatory framework to avoid 
monopolies, ensure the private ownership of the means of production, 
and protect individual freedom.  In the view of the ordo-liberals, both 
efficiency and distributive considerations were relevant for market 
correcting purposes and for competition rules, which prevented the 
creation of monopolies and the abuse of a dominant position.192  Within 
the ordo-liberal tradition there were two different lines of thought, 
which reflect significant differences within the tradition’s economic and 
legal approaches.  While the early ordo-liberal founders developed a 
procedural approach to the economic constitution, the second generation 
was largely associated with the social market economy.  The founders 
of the Freiburg school, Walter Eucken and Franz Böhm (whose disciple 
Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker actively participates in the debate on 
European private law), favored a procedural and rule-oriented approach 
to law.193  Their goal was to establish a framework of general rules, 
implemented by a centralized and interdependent administrative system, 
that would reform the market in an indirect way.194  In contrast, the 
second generation of ordo-liberal scholars, such as Alfred Mueller-
Armack and Wilhelm Röepke, were associated with the notion of a 
“social market economy.”195  Their interventionist economic project 
focused on outcome-oriented solutions, including a comprehensive 
welfare program, which Kerry Rittich defined as somehow “nostalgic, if 
not romantic and utopian, in its orientation.”196
In this second phase of European private law scholarship, lawyers 
were divided between those favoring the harmonization process and 
those opposing it.  The latter claimed that not only was the Community 
decision-maker―namely the Commission, the Council, and the 
European Parliament involved in the adoption of Community 
Acts―severely constrained from regulating social policy by its 
attributed competences, but that the ECJ jurisprudence was pervaded by 
a “market holistic” bias.197  Rather than a liberal interpretation of 
 191 See id. 
 192 KERRY RITTICH, RECHARACTERIZING RESTRUCTURING 112 (2002). 
 193 See Vanberg, supra note 186, at 35. 
 194 Id. at 37. 
 195 RITTICH, supra note 192, at 112. 
 196 Id. 
 197 See Alexander Somek, Good News for a Bad Habit: Tobacco, Culture and the Rule of Law 
in the European Union (2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file at Harvard Law School for the 
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European law, commentators, such as Alexander Somek, explained that 
the ECJ jurisprudence was driven by major free market concerns rather 
than social ones.  
These jurists asserted that while Member States’ regulatory 
capacity was limited by the legal constraints set up by the Community, 
harmonization of private law was constrained by the single market 
rationale.198  In response to the argument that there was a constitutional 
asymmetry in the EU, they advocated for a social and redistributive 
notion of contract law, which was embedded in the national private law 
regimes that were threatened by the Europeanization of contract law.199  
These jurists opposed the Europeanization process.  They advocated for 
a “national resistance” 200 against future harmonization by praising the 
values intrinsic in the local private law traditions.201
Jurists who advocated for a welfarist approach to private law and 
in favor of distributive justice in contract law argued that contract law 
should abandon a procedural conception of justice and move towards a 
substantive one.202  If the notion of procedural justice entailed the 
protection of individual rights and market efficiency, they favored a 
substantive notion of justice in order to achieve an “acceptable pattern 
of welfare” with fair distributive results.203
According to these lawyers, the Community leit-motif in drafting 
consumer protection directives rested on a market efficiency rationale, 
which aimed to expand consumer choice.  They pointed out that the 
Unfair Terms Directive204 presupposed that buyers were shopping for 
their best contractual terms across Member States and assumed that 
consumers would be better off through greater competition among 
contractual terms.205  They noted that the Commission assumed that 
consumers were actively involved in gathering and using information to 
European Law Reading Group), http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/elrc/events/2003-
2004/SomekOnPower.pdf (last visited Dec. 7, 2007); Alexander Somek, From Liberalism to 
Holism: Some Observations Regarding the ECJ’s New Theory of Community Competence, 143 
JURIDIKUM 6 (2004).  
 198 See SCHARPF, supra note 14, at 54−58. 
 199 See Collins, supra note 7, at 365. 
 200 See Caruso, supra note 16. 
 201 See Pierre Legrand, European Legal Systems Are Not Converging, 45 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 
52, 60-61 (1996). 
 202 See Hugh Collins, Distributive Justice Through Contracts, 45 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 49, 
51 (1992). 
 203 See Hugh Collins, Introduction: The Research Agenda of Implicit Dimensions of Contracts, 
in IMPLICIT DIMENSIONS OF CONTRACT: DISCRETE, RATIONAL AND NETWORK CONTRACTS 11 
(David Campbell, Hugh Collins & John Wightman eds., 2003). 
 204 Council Directive 93/13, 1993 O.J. (L 95) 29-34 (EEC). 
 205 GERAINT HOWELLS & THOMAS WILHELMSSON, EC CONSUMER LAW (1997).  
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make decisions.206  The Unfair Terms Directive enlisted contract law as 
a market-perfecting device through which properly informed consumers 
could avoid unfair terms.207
When explaining the stakes of harmonization, jurists put forward 
three different theses that all share a skeptical view on the European 
constitutional arrangement: national resistance (Caruso), subsidiarity 
(Collins) and cultural difference.208  The national resistance thesis 
focuses on the reactions of national legal regimes to the implementation 
of European directives.209  According to this view, the problem of 
harmonization of contract law manifests itself in the implementation of 
the directives in the Member States’ legal orders, often represented by 
national civil codes.  The different outcomes of the implementation of 
the Unfair Terms Directive in Italy, Germany, and France revealed not 
only the difficulty of harmonizing contract rules but also how little 
national contract laws were harmonized in practice.210  Daniela Caruso 
claimed that the Commission’s attempt to reform private law through 
directives has actually prompted national legislators and courts to resist 
the Europeanization process.211
The subsidiarity thesis, based on the subsidiarity principle 
introduced by the Maastricht Treaty,212 focuses on the social dimension 
of contract law as being inherently national and therefore culturally 
diverse.  Some jurists claimed that contract law could not rely on 
 206 Id.  See generally Weatherill, supra note 77, at 57. 
 207 See Collins supra note 143, at 237 (explaining that the consumerist movement “has 
percolated into the organs of the EC”). 
 208 See infra notes 209-216. 
 209 See Caruso, supra note 16. 
 210 See id. at 24.  Daniela Caruso describes how the implementation of the Unfair Contract 
Terms Directive encountered resistance from national legislators.  In particular, the Products 
Liability Directive of 1985 was a big disappointment, as Member States delayed its 
implementation.  Id. 
 211 See id. 
 212 See George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European 
Community and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 332 (1994) (citing the subsidiarity 
principle as explained in revised Article 3b of the Maastricht Treaty on the  European Union 
(TEU)).  The subsidiarity principle states: 
In areas which do not fall within its exclusive Competence, the Community shall 
take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as 
the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member 
States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be 
better achieved by the Community. 
Id. at 346.  Bermann’s article analyzes the principle of subsidiarity in reference to procedural 
aspects, rather than in light of any substantive criteria that it may offer to officers of the court.  
See also Grainne de Burca, Re-appraising Subsidiarity’s Significance After Amsterdam (Harvard 
Law Sch. Jean Monnet Working Paper Group, Paper No. 7/99, 2000), available at 
http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/99/990701.rtf. 
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abstract general principles and therefore that Europeanization was not 
appropriate in this area.213  They argued that the Commission should 
make greater use of the subsidiarity principle, allowing Member States 
to regulate their contract law regimes in different manners.  Those 
subscribing to the subsidiarity thesis have advanced the view that 
national contract law is replete with distributive concerns, which are 
now threatened by European market integration.  According to this 
thesis, Europeanization is a formalist process that suppresses diversity 
as an obstacle to free trade, while it undermines the distributive capacity 
of national contract law.214
Some jurists have advanced a third thesis based on the notion of 
cultural difference.  In valuing the cultural diversity among national 
legal regimes, they view the possibilities of the harmonization process 
skeptically.  Drawing on sociological,215 cultural,216 and linguistic217 
insights, these scholars are skeptical of the unification of private law 
regimes that occurs more at the level of declamations than at the level of 
operative rules.  In their view, the harmonization of contract law erases 
European identities and offers a troubling systematization of contract 
law without attempting to tackle the fragmentation of legal contexts and 
the dilemmas of the welfare state.218  Scholars adopting the cultural 
difference thesis generally argue against Europeanization by 
characterizing it as a formalist threat to preserving the cultural tradition 
inherent in local or national contract law regimes.219
V. SELECTIVE RECEPTION OF U.S. LAW AND ECONOMICS 
A. The Ideological Divide: Receiving Mainstream Law and Economics 
In the late 1990s, the debate over European private law became 
increasingly politicized.  On the one hand, neoliberal scholars began 
 213 See Hugh Collins, Transaction Costs and Subsidiarity in European Contract Law, in 2 
PRIVATE LAW IN EUROPEAN CONTENT SERIES: AN ACADEMIC GREEN PAPER ON EUROPEAN 
CONTRACT LAW 269 (Stefan Grundman, & Jules Stuyck eds., 2003). 
 214 See Collins, supra note 143. 
 215 See Gunter Teubner, Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law 
Ends Up in New Divergences, 61 MOD. L. REV. 11 (1998). 
 216 See Legrand, supra note 201, at 60. 
 217 See Sacco, supra note 36. 
 218 See Thomas Wilhelmsson, Welfare State Expectations, Privatisation and Private Law in 
FROM DISSONANCE TO SENSE: WELFARE STATE EXPECTATIONS, PRIVATISATION AND PRIVATE 
LAW (Thomas Wilhelmsson & Samului Hurri eds., 1999). 
 219 Pierre Legrand, La leçon d’Apollinaire, in L’HARMONIZATION DU DROIT DES CONTRATS 
EN EUROPE 37 (Christophe Jamin & Denis Mazeaud eds., 2001). 
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familiarizing themselves with law and economics analyses imported 
from the United States while also realizing that Social Europe, in the 
realm of private law, was more effective than what they hoped for.220  
On the other hand, social justice advocates, rather than rejecting Europe 
tout court, began engaging with European private law by proposing, in 
their Social Justice Manifesto, some avenues of reform for the 
Commission’s agenda.  In this third phase, not only did the views 
opposing and in favor of European harmonization change radically, but 
most interestingly, democratic legitimacy claims were made by jurists 
on the Right and on the Left to criticize ECJ adjudication in a highly 
strategic way.  While neoliberal jurists influenced by U.S. law and 
economics turned against the Europeanization of private law, social 
justice advocates turned towards European private law. 
In this changing scenario, neoliberal jurists advocated for greater 
efficiency of the internal market, but they also started to oppose the 
“forced harmonization” of contract law in Europe.221  While supporting 
greater diversity among private law regimes rather than harmonization 
projects, these neoliberal scholars justified diversity of national contract 
laws by the subsidiarity principle.  Roger Van den Bergh affirmed that 
Member States should resist the harmonization process because 
diversity of contractual regimes improved efficiency within the single 
market.222  According to this view, the application of the subsidiarity 
principle could enhance regulatory competition, reduce transaction 
costs, and satisfy preferences―thus maximizing market efficiency.223
In adopting United States mainstream law and economics insights, 
neoliberal jurists attacked welfare provisions contained in European 
directives.224  They deployed public choice rationales to undermine the 
goals of the Unfair Terms Directive, which they claimed “may cause 
inefficiencies rather then curing them.”225  In drawing on law and 
economic insights, they argued that although the Directive aimed to 
 220 See supra Part IIC (discussing reactions to the ECJ Simone Leitner case). 
 221 See Van den Bergh, supra note 8, at 254. 
 222 See Bermann, supra note 212 (discussing the subsidiarity principle of EC Treaty art. 5). 
 223 See Roger Van den Bergh, The Subsidiarity Principle in European Community Law: Some 
Insights from Law and Economics; 1:4 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 337, 339 (1994). 
 224 For a definition of United States mainstream law and economics, see Duncan Kennedy, 
supra note 179.  For a definition of the same as it pertains European private law, see Roberto 
Pardolesi, Clausole Abusive, Pardon Vessatorie: Verso L’attuazione di una Direttiva Abusata, 
CARDOZO ELECTRONIC L. BULL. (1995), http://www.jus.unitn.it/cardozo/Review/home.html 
(attacking the unfair contract terms directive).  For a more recent approach, see ANTONIO 
CUCINOTTA, ROBERTO PARDOLESI & ROGER VAN DEN BERGH, POST-CHICAGO DEVELOPMENTS 
ON ANTITRUST LAW (2002). 
 225 See Van den Bergh, supra note 8, at 261. 
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protect consumers against unfairness, in reality it created potential 
inefficiencies, causing negative welfare implications.226
In receiving United States mainstream law and economics theories, 
European jurists began associating institutional competence arguments 
(courts versus legislatures) with substantive values (efficiency versus 
distribution).  For instance, in criticizing the institutional changes 
triggered by the Unfair Terms Directive, they deployed Mitchell 
Polinsky’s view to argue that the increased discretion of judges to 
decide the unfairness of the terms would limit the autonomy of private 
parties to achieve an efficient solution.227  They claimed that since 
efficiency provides objectivity, this is a “technical everyday problem 
solving” tool that keeps “political disagreements outside the core” of 
scholarly fields.228  According to these jurists, distribution concerns, 
which are inherently political and subjective, should remain outside of 
both the sphere of judicial interpretation and the scholarly analysis of 
lawyers.  When contributing to the European private law debate, they 
argued that the interpretation of directives by courts should be guided 
by efficiency goals instead of distributive considerations.  Thus, while 
the ECJ could legitimately address efficiency considerations, 
distributive concerns should be left to Member State legislatures. 
In selectively adopting US law and economics, European scholars 
advocated for minimal state intervention in private transactions, 
allowing pockets of public regulation as long as these ensured free and 
competitive market places.229  They claimed that, instead of benefiting 
consumers, welfarist legislations backfired and hurt the people the 
legislations were trying to help.  In fact, by increasing the prices of 
consumer goods, sellers could easily pass on the costs of a warranty to 
the consumers.  In this way, some of the beneficiaries of the warranty 
would be driven out of the market. 
In addressing compulsory terms, which performed an insurance-
like function for buyers, US mainstream law and economics scholars 
argued that they created inefficient outcomes by diminishing overall 
consumer welfare by increasing prices.  The warranty undermined the 
 226 Peter Van Wijck & Jules Theeuwes, Protection Against Unfair Contracts: An Economic 
Analysis of European Regulation, 9 EUR. J. L. & ECON.73 (2000). 
 227 See Pardolesi, supra note 224. 
 228 See UGO MATTEI, COMPARATIVE LAW AND ECONOMICS 5 (1997). 
 229 See Richard A. Epstein, Contracts Small and Contract Large: Contract Law Through the 
Lens of Laissez-Faire, in THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 25, 30-31 (F.H. 
Buckley ed., 1999) (stating that laissez-faire makes “explicit substantive judgments about which 
kind of regulations work in the common interest and which do not; . . . its practical side stresses 
the bad consequences to civil society that flow from ambitious government regimes of taxation 
and regulation that violate its precepts”). 
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goal of reducing transaction costs through contracts of adhesion and 
made marginal groups of consumers worse off because they were priced 
out of the market.  Thus, compulsory warranties in consumer contracts 
“run[] counter to prevailing redistributive rationales” by creating non-
optimal market results.230
Chicago legal economists explained that when buyers are free to 
choose any contractual term they will benefit from market competition 
and will choose the most efficient term for their transaction.231  
Regulation of consumer contracts through judicial or legislative 
intervention, such as the unconscionability doctrine or compulsory 
warranties, will diminish the overall market efficiency.  First, equity 
doctrines allow judges to deploy the unequal bargaining power rhetoric, 
which is not a “fruitful, or even meaningful” criterion to assess legal 
consequences.232  Second, courts are “institutionally incapable of 
choosing the defining values and finding the relevant facts” in order to 
determine equity considerations.233  Third, private regulation made by 
markets is more efficient than judicial intervention based on fairness, 
since the former accurately reflects the aggregate preference of 
buyers.234
 230 Alan Schwartz, A Reexamination of Non-Substantive Unconscionability, 63 VA. L. REV. 
1053, 1062 (1977). 
The efficiency of a standardized contract lies in its internal construction—once the seller pre-
establishes the terms of the contract and the consumer is presented with a ‘take it or leave it’ 
agreement.  Both buyer and seller thereby avoid further transaction costs of negotiating individual 
agreements while a legal rule restricting the enforceability of standardized contracts creates large 
efficiency loss. 
 231 See Richard Posner, The Federal Trade Commission, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 47, 61-78 (1969).  
Posner not only critiques the inefficiency of FTC regulation that is unable to protect consumers, 
but he also claims that “administrative enforcement of antifraud principles has no comparative 
advantage procedurally or institutionally, over judicial” enforcement.  Id. at 67. 
 232 RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 87 (2d ed. 1977). 
 233 Alan Schwartz, Seller Unequal Bargaining Power and The Judicial Process 49 IND. L.J. 
367, 367-368 (1974).  To assess whether buyers in a given transaction do or do not have unequal 
bargaining power, courts have the impossible task of determining, in relation to the market and to 
the choice of terms offered to buyers at different prices, if the given term of a contract is fair or 
not.  In Schwartz’s view, courts do not have standard criteria to strike down a clause because it 
required an excessive price.  Moreover, judges use two sets of non-convincing arguments: (1) the 
term can be void because it produces effects that are inconsistent with the policies that the court 
enforces, and (2) the term can be void because the seller’s power produced that term.  Id. at 368. 
 234 See id. at 380  Schwartz uses the consumer sovereignty rhetoric even when buyers 
negotiate for terms with a monopolist.  He states, “these buyers may still, in the aggregate, choose 
the contract clauses which monopolists offer.  Those choices are more likely to reflect their own 
preferences than the choices courts would make for them.”  See also RICHARD POSNER, 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 86-129 (5th ed. 1998).  Posner offers an alternative 
interpretation of the Thomas Walker Furniture case, suggesting that the seller’s right of 
repossession was an efficient way to allow consumers to purchase the goods in advance. 
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Even more significantly, European scholars adopted what U.S. 
mainstream legal economists referred to as “Kaldor-Hicks efficiency” as 
the objective guiding principle that would drive decisions of both 
legislators and judges.  While the Pareto-superiority criterion did not 
favor those rules, which cannot make both buyers and sellers better off, 
the Kaldor-Hicks criterion allows choosing a rule even if only the seller 
is better off, as long as the seller’s gain exceeds the buyer’s losses.  The 
seller would then theoretically be able to compensate the buyer.  Even 
when the choice of a determined rule justified by a Kaldor-Hicks 
criterion creates actual losers, the rule is the most efficient one, since as 
Posner puts it “the winners could compensate the losers, whether or not 
they actually do.”235
The Kaldor-Hicks criterion refers to the relationship between the 
aggregate benefits and the aggregate costs of a situation, thus referring 
to the “size of the pie”‘ and its overall maximization.  The attractiveness 
of this criterion, which mainstream legal economists presented as an 
objective one, is that everyone can be better off if society is organized 
in an efficient manner.  In dismissing the distributive consequences of 
the efficient solution and depicting society as an aggregate of individual 
well being, mainstream legal economists deployed Kaldor-Hicks 
efficiency as a neutral and non-political criterion.  In allowing this 
trade-off between ‘efficiency’ and ‘distribution’ of resources, because 
of the beneficial increase in aggregate wealth, mainstream legal 
economists set aside more political and costly distributive choices. 
Mainstream legal economists put forward a consistent institutional 
competence argument according to which judges should pursue Kaldor-
Hicks efficiency while they should set aside distributive goals in 
adjudication.  According to them, it is difficult or impossible to 
redistribute through legal rules, and legislatures only have the 
competence to deal with distribution of resources.  In their view, 
legislatures rather than courts are institutionally capable of deciding 
distributive questions.  By means of the government’s tax and transfer 
systems, legislative decisions are likely to be more precise than the 
decision of a random judge.236  Due to high administrative costs of the 
 235 See RICHARD POSNER, supra note 232, at 518:  
The use of liability rules or other legal sanctions to redistribute income from wealthy 
to poor is likely to miscarry.  A rule of liability is like an exercise tax: it induces a 
contraction in output and increases price.  However, the part made liable may be able 
to shift much of the liability cost on the poor through prices.  The result is a 
capricious redistribution of income and wealth within the class of poor people 
themselves and an overall reduction in their welfare. 
 236 See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 4 (1999) (“Economists 
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legal system, mainstream legal economists advocate that legislatures are 
not only the most apt but also the most efficient institutions to decide 
distributional issues.237
B. Resisting law and Economics: Social Justice in European Contract 
Law 
From a different ideological perspective, jurists advocating for 
social justice in European private law drafted a manifesto in 2004 to 
address democratic concerns regarding the harmonization process.238  
The Social Justice Manifesto focuses on the need to secure legitimacy, 
namely democratic acceptance of the socio-economic values embedded 
in the harmonization of private law.  In advocating for greater social 
justice and legitimacy in European contract law, the Manifesto stresses 
the importance of preserving cultural and local diversity that allows 
“variation, experimentation and innovation.”239  In short, the Manifesto 
aims to tie the European notion of a social market economy together 
with regulatory legitimacy in order to overcome the troubling 
democratic deficit in the EU.240
In following a well-known social tradition in contract law, social 
justice advocates state that the new European legal culture offers a 
possibility to depart from legal formalism, allowing for a more 
contextualized and open dialogue about the political stakes of European 
understand how laws affect the distribution of income and wealth across classes and groups and 
while they often recommend changes that increase efficiency, they try to avoid taking sides in 
disputes about distribution, usually leaving recommendations about distribution to policy-makers 
or voter.”). 
 237 See A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 9-10, 125 (2d 
ed. 1989) (arguing that “[i]t is often impossible to redistribute income through the choice of legal 
rules and even when it’s possible redistribution through government tax and transfer system may 
be cheaper and is likely to be more precise” so that  “redistribution through legal rules is costly, 
not precise for income groups purposes and it only takes place when a dispute happens, not on a 
consistent base”).  For a more recent approach, see LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, 
FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 31−35 (2002).  
 238 See Hugh Collins, Editorial, The Future of European Private Law: An Introduction, 10 
EUR. L.J. 649 (2004). 
 239 See Study Group on Social Justice in European Private Law, Social Justice in European 
Contract Law: A Manifesto, 10 EUR. L.J. 653, 672 (2004) [hereinafter Social Justice Manifesto]. 
 240 Collins, supra note 238, at 650: 
The institutions of the European Union, with their unique constellation of multilevel 
systems of governance, are not designed, and were never intended to be competent, 
to engage in the construction of such a political settlement.  If Europe is to embark 
on this process of general harmonization of laws, it should not start from here, that is 
the current processes for enacting legislation, because those processes lack the 
necessary legitimacy to engage with these fundamental political questions. 
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integration.241  These scholars explain that the problem with the 
harmonization of private law arises when national fairness standards are 
replaced by a much narrower conception of the principle of social 
justice than the one existing at the national level.  They fear that such 
replacement is likely to occur in order to secure the effective realization 
of European regulation. 
Rather than a technocratic enterprise based on neutral principles 
such as freedom of contract, social justice advocates in their Manifesto 
envisage European contract law as a set of doctrinal rules chosen to 
advance fairness and distributive justice.242  They emphasize that the 
harmonization of contract law needs to be understood as part of 
European multi-level governance that creates political consequences for 
citizens of the Union and not merely as a functional tool for the 
completion of the internal market.  In opposing a technocratic approach 
to harmonization, they depart from those progressive views suggesting 
tout court the need to resist harmonization of contract law because the 
European level is pervaded by constitutional asymmetry.  In contrast, 
they side with the slogan “Hard Code now!”243
Thus social justice advocates claim that unification of private law 
should proceed as part of the political evolution to construct the 
European Union.  The Commission should address socio-economic 
values more openly and democratically through “new methods for the 
construction of this union of shared fundamental values (which include 
respect for cultural diversity) as represented in the law of contract and 
the remainder of private law.”244  They state, 
Unless a more democratic and accountable process is initiated, there 
is a clear danger that these fundamental issues will never be openly 
addressed, and a serious risk that powerful interest groups will be 
able to manipulate the technocratic process behind the scenes in 
order to secure their interests at the expense of the welfare of 
ordinary citizens.245
In embracing the view that the European Union is pervaded by an 
asymmetry when it comes to social justice, these scholars claim, “The 
values of negative integration and competition were never intended to 
 241 See MARTIJN W. HESSELINK, THE NEW EUROPEAN LEGAL CULTURE 72 (2001); Robert W. 
Gordon, Macaulay, Macneil and the Discovery of Solidarity and Power in Contract Law, 1985 
WISC. L. REV. 565 (1985). 
 242 See HUGH COLLINS, REGULATING CONTRACTS (1999). 
 243 See Ugo Mattei, Hard Code Now!, 2 GLOBAL JURIST FRONTIERS 1:1 (2002) (arguing that a 
European Code will benefit consumers, but that soft law measures would advance corporate 
interests). 
 244 Social Justice Manifesto, supra note 239, at 657. 
 245 Id. at 658.  
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provide an exhaustive scheme of social justice for a market order.  They 
should not be used now as the exclusive determinative foundations for a 
consensus of values underpinning European contract law.”246
In considering the distributive consequences of contract law, the 
Manifesto provides no answer to neoliberal critics for which social 
legislation is highly inefficient because it passes on the costs of 
protections.  Neoliberals argue that when the distribution of wealth 
happens through cross-subsidies among differently situated groups of 
buyers these “are prima facie unjustifiable.”247
The second idea of the Manifesto is that the constitutionalization of 
private law provides the opportunity to give a concrete expression to 
individual rights protected by the European Convention of Human 
Rights and to the social and economic rights recognized by the Nice 
Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union.248  However, 
the constitutionalization approach of the Manifesto recognizes social 
rights only to European citizens.  Immigrants, or socially marginalized 
individuals who are excluded from the possibility of concluding 
contracts, will not enjoy European social rights. 
C. The Distributive Analysis: A Limited Reception 
In response to the attacks of Chicago legal economists to welfare 
regulation by administrative agencies and courts, some United States 
jurists developed a distributive analysis of legal rules as an alternative 
law and economics theory.  In deploying a law and economics 
methodology, these progressive scholars began writing in the 1970s, but 
it was not until the 1990s that European jurists became aware of the 
distributive analysis. 
One could trace the distributive analysis back to an article by 
Arthur Leff, which demonstrated how the legal process creates high 
transaction costs that are unequally distributed among litigants, 
especially between business and consumers.249  The following year, 
 246 Id. at 667.  
 247 Duncan Kennedy, Thoughts on Coherence, Social Values and National Tradition in 
Private Law, in THE POLITICS OF A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE 9 (Martin W. Hesselink ed., 2006). 
 248 See Social Justice Manifesto, supra note 239, at 667. 
 249 See RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 337-38 (1st ed. 1973) (claiming 
that three factors can affect the decision to settle rather than litigate: “the relative cost of litigation 
and settlement, the parties’ attitude toward risk and differences between the parties’ judgment of 
the likely outcome of litigation”).  See also Arthur A Leff, Injury, Ignorance, Spite—The 
Dynamics of Coercive Collection, 80 YALE L.J. 1, 8 (1970).  Leff engages with the law and 
economics methodology by offering four reasons for the costs of due process: 
First, due process demands that at the outset the court and its officers be wholly 
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Bruce Ackerman’s response to the attack by Chicago legal economists 
against welfare regulation elaborated an economic model to justify the 
enforcement of housing codes as a means to rectify inequalities in 
wealth distribution.250  In response to the argument that the cost of 
social legislation is passed on to the poor he elaborated an economic 
model that showed the contrary.  An effective and comprehensive 
housing code could, under certain conditions, redistribute income from 
landlords to tenants.251
In the 1980s, scholars shifted their attention from administrative 
regulation to private law rules because housing codes were no longer a 
viable option under the current administration.  Duncan Kennedy 
applied Ackerman’s economic model to justify the use of compulsory 
terms in contract and tort rules.  Despite the attempt by sellers to pass 
on the costs of the mandatory term to buyers, their effectiveness 
depended on the shape of supply and demand curves and the 
competitive structure of the market.  By disaggregating the group of 
buyers in at least four sub-groups, in relation to their utility and risk 
preferences, the introduction of an insurance-like term had distributive 
consequences “possibly, not necessarily including enriching part of the 
buyer group at the expense of other buyers and sellers.”252
In following the compulsory terms analysis, Richard Craswell 
demonstrated that the benefit of a warranty in consumer contracts is 
“inversely related to sellers’ ability to pass on their costs.”253  In 
rejecting the indeterminacy of the passing-on-the-cost argument, he 
showed that distributive gains were perceived, not by an increase in 
price, but through the willingness to pay of marginal consumers.254  
ignorant of what happened and it is expensive to educate them, at least using the 
pleading-and-playlet format of the common law.  Second, the process of education 
cannot proceed on a generalized (mass produced) basis; each case is theoretically 
hand-crafted.  Third, save in a court of small claims it is usually specialists (e.g., 
lawyers) who do the crafting.  Fourth, because the courts do not allocate docket 
space by competitive bidding between plaintiffs, the creditor with the largest claim 
at stake must take his place in a “queue” behind plaintiffs with smaller claims. 
 250 See Bruce Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets On Behalf of the Poor: Of 
Housing Codes, Housing Subsidies and Income Redistribution Policy, 80 YALE L.J. 1093 (1971). 
 251 See id. at 1111. 
 252 See Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with 
Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563 
app. B at 654 (1982). 
 253 See Richard Craswell, Passing on the Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency and Distribution in 
Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 STAN. L. REV. 361, 398 (1991). 
 254 See id. (“If sellers can pass on much of the costs of a rule, this usually indicates that 
consumers benefit a good deal from the rule.  If sellers cannot pass on very much of their costs, 
the rule has probably made their product less attractive to consumers.”). 
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More recent applications have analyzed the favorable consequences of 
welfare regulations for specific groups of workers through 
accommodation mandates255 and particular debtors through the 
imposition of compulsory terms protecting mortgagors.256
One of the most important receptions of the distributive analysis in 
European scholarship can be traced to Hugh Collins’s work in the 
1990s.  In response to European lawyers engaging with mainstream law 
and economics,257 Collins addressed the regulation of contractual 
unfairness and the costs of effective welfare regulation.  In examining 
the Unfair Terms Directive, he emphasized that consumers are unlikely 
to litigate the term before a court; thus the Directive has little impact on 
the use and content of adhesion contracts.  Moreover, according to 
Collins, the Directive suffered “the weakness of creating an 
unsophisticated framework for enquiry”258 in which the judge lacks 
information to police a particular clause because of insufficient 
information about the market conditions, the particular quality of the 
product, and the business conditions to supply it.  In attacking the “open 
texture rules” or general clauses to police unfairness, Collins claimed 
that they favor businesses rather than consumers since such rules 
require judges to contextualize the legal framework.259  Collins asserted 
that private law regulation cannot improve contractual fairness by open 
texture rules, but instead should do so through higher formal standards.  
For instance, the Unfair Terms Directive set up a black list of unfair 
terms, which are to be immediately voided by judges.260  Moreover, 
through an examination of empirical models, Collins convincingly 
argued that there are markets in which the price of welfare regulation, 
such as minimum wages or compulsory duties of disclosure, cannot be 
passed on to the protected group.261  In these cases regulating unfairness 
produces the desired redistributive results, and formal standards or 
 255 Christine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, 53 STAN. L. REV. 223 (2000).  In demonstrating 
that favourable distributive effects are assured for certain accommodated groups, Jolls provides a 
counterpoint to the existing literature, which assumes that desirable effects for accommodated 
workers are unlikely to happen because costs will be shifted to the accommodated group in the 
form of reduced wages or reduced employment. 
 256 See Duncan Kennedy, The Ex-Post Distributive Case for Insurance Like Compulsory 
Terms in Consumer Contracts (1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author). 
 257 See COLLINS, supra note 242. 
 258 Id. at 233. 
 259 See Hugh Collins, Formalism and Efficiency: Designing European Commercial Law, 8 
Eur. Rev. Private L. 211 (2000). 
 260 See Council Directive 93/13/EEC, art. 3(3), 1993 O.J. (L 95) 29 (EEC) (addressing the 
Unfair Terms Directive’s “indicative” but “non-exhaustive” list of terms that “may” be unfair). 
 261 See COLLINS, supra note 242, at 286. 
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compulsory terms produce a better regulatory outcome than open 
texture rules such as good faith or other general clauses. 
The reception of the distributive analysis in European legal thought 
was limited to those progressive scholars addressing consumer 
regulations and, tangentially, European private law.262  Scholars have 
not yet elaborated a response, aiming to show desirable economic 
effects of welfarist regulations for determinate groups of buyers, 
debtors, or workers, to counter the attacks against social welfare 
regulation by jurists who support regulatory competition for European 
contract law.263
An example of a regulatory effort that, while highly criticized by 
scholars, has not been subject to any form of meaningful scrutiny is the 
Directive harmonizing the law of consumer sales and warranties.264  
Adopted by the Council in 1999 after a long and difficult struggle 
between conflicting political and economic interests, the Directive is an 
outstanding example of how European scholarship fails to address the 
distributive consequences of Community re-regulation.  Aimed at 
improving the functioning of the internal market, the Directive 
harmonizes guarantee regimes in consumer sales.265
Under this Sales-Warranties Directive, sellers must warrant the 
conformity (merchantability) of their goods for at least two years 
following the delivery to the consumer.  If a good lacks conformity, the 
remedies available to the consumer are repair and replacement of the 
good and, in the alternative, price reduction and rescission of the 
contract.266  Member States have the possibility of introducing an 
obligation for consumers to inform the seller of the defect within a 
flexible notification period of at least two months.267  The Directive 
requires that if the guarantee under national laws has a limitation period, 
 262 See id.; see also GOOD FAITH IN CONTRACT: CONCEPT AND CONTEXT (Roger Brownsword, 
Norma J. Hird, & Geraint Howells eds., 1999); Leone Niglia, Standard Form Contracts in 
Europe and North America: One Hundred Years of Unfair Terms?, in INTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVES ON CONSUMERS’ ACCESS TO JUSTICE 101, 127 (Charles E.F. Rickett & Thomas 
G.W. Telfer eds., 2003). 
 263 See Stuyck, supra note 64. 
 264 See Council Directive 1999/44/EC, On Certain Aspects of the Sale of Consumer Goods 
and Associated Guarantees, 1999 O.J., (L 171/12) (EC) (hereinafter Sales-Warranties Directive). 
 265 See id. art. 1(2)(e).  According to the definitions, a guarantee 
shall mean any undertaking by a seller or producer to the consumer, given without 
extra charge, to reimburse the price paid or to replace, repair or handle consumer 
goods in any way if they do not meet the specifications set out in the guarantee 
statement or in the relevant advertising.
 266 Id. art. 3-5. 
 267 See id. art. 5(2) and for used goods art. 7(1).  Art. 7(1) states that the period should be no 
less than one year, and both provisions allow Member States to enact more stringent provisions. 
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this time period cannot be less than two years from the day of delivery.  
In that case the directive places consumers in a more advantageous 
position than under several national laws.268
Some jurists have criticized this measure as a paternalistic 
intervention, imposing a compulsory warranty that harms consumers 
instead of protecting them.  By overestimating the risks for consumers, 
the introduction of the compulsory warranty forces sellers to pass on the 
cost of the term to consumers.  Thus, the mandatory warranties will 
increase prices of goods while also stimulating alternative solutions to 
circumvent the compulsory term.  For instance, after the adoption of the 
Directive, Germany imposed a mandatory liability for used cars of at 
least one year.  Scholars argue that this regulation has increased market 
prices for used cars, while creating incentives for lawyers to circumvent 
the compulsory warranty.  In light of these assumptions, they suggest 
that a more sound solution would have left it up to private parties to 
negotiate conditions of a warranty for non-conformity.  Rather than 
adopting an ex-ante perspective by imposing the mandatory warranty, 
they suggest that in the case of a violation of contractual good faith, 
national courts could enforce ex-post the Unfair Terms Directive.269
In response to such claim, a distributive analysis of the German 
market of used cars could show how the ‘passing-on-the-cost’ argument 
is highly indeterminate, and that the argument that consumers benefit 
from a mandatory rule only when sellers cannot pass on the cost of the 
warranty is misleading.  For instance, a distributive analysis of the 
effect of the warranty in this case could demonstrate whether the value 
of the good offered in the market after the imposition of the compulsory 
term is underestimated by marginal consumers.  Through cross 
subsidization among marginal and infra-marginal consumers, some 
buyers will fully benefit from a compulsory warranty “only when sellers 
are able to pass on a large share of their costs.”270  Consequently, jurists 
should argue whether the compulsory warranty creates more or less 
consumer welfare without relying on the consumers’ willingness to pay, 
which is a highly indeterminate criterion. 
If by imposing a compulsory warranty the Sales-Warranties 
 268 See id. art. 5: 
The seller shall be held liable under Article 3 where the lack of conformity becomes 
apparent within two years as from delivery of the goods.  If, under national 
legislation, the rights laid down in Article 3(2) are subject to a limitation period, that 
period shall not expire within a period of two years from the time of delivery. 
 269 See Gerhard Wagner, The Economics of Harmonization: The Case of Contract Law, 39 
Common Mkt. L. Rev. 995, 1020 (2002). 
 270 See Craswell, supra note 253, at 361. 
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Directive favors certain consumers because it burdens the sellers with 
the cost of the information about the risk of the products, one should 
still assess how redistribution plays out, not necessarily among buyers 
and sellers, but between different groups of buyers.  In Craswell’s 
analysis of consumer contracts, buyers might end up benefiting from the 
mandatory guarantee, but their willingness to pay varies in a way that is 
not related to the warranty’s true benefits.  In order to determine 
whether consumer welfare increases, one should address the 
“relationship between the warranty’s true benefits and the marginal 
consumer willingness to pay for the warranty” rather than the sheer 
price increase.271  In the case of second hand cars in Germany, jurists 
should verify which groups of consumers are benefiting from the 
warranty and how redistribution takes place in that market.  By means 
of this analysis scholars could respond to the ‘passing-on-the-cost’ 
claim by showing that consumers are willing to pay for a product, 
namely the used car plus the guarantee, that they would not get from the 
market without the regulatory intervention of the Directive.272
According to social justice advocates, the ECJ is institutionally 
constrained to address efficiency consideration because of a 
constitutional asymmetry pervading the EU.  Ultimately, these jurists 
argue that judges, and European judges in particular, cannot be fully 
trusted to promote social justice.273  This idea is based on the view that 
substantive and social justice concepts should pass through legislatures, 
as they reflect the democratic consensus, whereas one should be 
skeptical of judges because of their elitist or passive take on such 
concepts. 
This part demonstrated that neoliberal advocates have deployed 
United States law and economics theories to limit the harmonization of 
private law rules.  In contrast, social justice advocates have resisted the 
reception of United States law and economics to argue in favor of 
harmonized rules.  However, both groups deploy similar institutional 
competence claims, and they have strategically deployed constitutional 
asymmetry claims to criticize ECJ adjudication and to delegitimate 
European and national courts at the benefit of Community or national 
legislatures. 
As a result, European jurists on both sides of the political spectrum 
have not yet engaged with the distributive consequences of private law 
rules.  In particular, when European courts rather than national 
 271 Id. at 391. 
 272 See Kennedy, supra note 252. 
 273 See Social Justice Manifesto, supra note 239. 
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legislatures determine private law rules, European jurists tend to 
collapse institutional competence arguments with substantial ones rather 
than assessing their distributive consequences. 
This article showed that even if some jurists have welcomed―and 
others have resisted―the virtual transplant of United States legal 
thought for a variety of legal, socio-economic, and historical reasons, at 
the operational level both groups recurrently adopt constitutional 
asymmetry claims in ways that constrain the debate on European private 
law to a pair of stifled positions. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Recently, lawyers, scholars, and judges have changed their claims 
towards European private law, and this change has taken place in the 
broader context of a transatlantic dialogue between European and U.S. 
lawyers and scholars.  This article demonstrates that despite a recurrent 
claim made by European private lawyers that there is a constitutional 
asymmetry in the EU, in the last decade such a claim has lost its appeal.  
While a deeper understanding of European integration has required 
lawyers to pay greater attention to ECJ jurisprudence, others lawyers 
have engaged in the bigger enterprise of elaborating new ideas and 
receiving new legal theories that could better inform them in how to 
approach the harmonization of legal rules.  Primarily, European lawyers 
have shifted the focus of their analysis from democratic legitimacy 
concerns to substantive concerns by addressing the consequences of 
legal rules.  This change in part explains the current emphasis of the 
European Commission on modernizing rather than drafting new 
regulations and the important role played by legal scholars in advising 
and legitimizing the work of the Commission.274  Moreover, the 
selective reception of United States law and economics has induced 
lawyers to partly reject the harmonization of legal rules in favor of 
regulatory competition models.  Finally, the creation of a well-
established group of European private law academics, with a large 
number of publications in this field, has enriched the debate and has 
demonstrated how the field is increasingly ideologically and politically 
divided.275
 274 See Green Paper, supra note 108. 
 275 See Mattei & Nicola, supra note 156. 
